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The Symbols of Governance:
Thurman Arnold and Post-Realist
Legal Theory
MARK FENSTERt
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colleagues Bill Page and Chris Slobogin. Financial support was provided by a
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Though rooted in the legal realism with which he is
typically associated,2  Thurman Arnold's mid-1930s
monographs, The Symbols of Government and The Folklore
of Capitalism,3 in fact attempted to establish a new
approach in American legal theory: the critical study of the
symbolic domain of governance.' While the traditional legal
realist critique revealed the historically constructed and
contingent nature of the legal forms that legal formalists
essentialized, Symbols and Folklore instead inquired into
the importance of the cultural "symbols" and "folklore" of
governance. Arnold thus aligned himself with legal
formalists and traditional economists (whose work realists
also critiqued) by arguing that certain assumptions
regarding legal doctrine, political structure, and a capitalist
economy seemed essential to the governing institutions of
the United States, even as he agreed with legal realists that
many of those assumptions were outdated, inefficient, and
unjust. Unlike conventional realists, Arnold had little faith
that mere reform would cure governing institutions and the
public of their irrational investments in the symbols of
government and capitalism. Such symbols, he argued, form
the terrain upon which the struggle for political and legal
2. See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960, at 34-35 (1986);
WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 67-69 (1973);
Douglas Ayer, In Quest of Efficiency: The Ideological Journey of Thurman
Arnold in the Interwar Period, 23 STAN. L. REV. 1049 (1971); Neil Duxbury,
Some Radicalism About Realism? Thurman Arnold and the Politics of Modern
Jurisprudence, 10 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 11, 12 (1990); John Henry Schlegel,
American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the Yale
Experience, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 459, 511-12, 568-70 & n.585, 589 (1979).
3. THURMAN ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM (1937) [hereinafter
FOLKLORE]; THURMAN ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT (1935)
[hereinafter SYMBOLS].
4. By "governance" I refer to the expansion of the strategies of political rule
beyond its traditional institutional confines within the political and legal
apparatuses of the state. In Nikolas Rose's terms, this conception of governance
"rejects the view that one must account for the political assemblages of rule in
terms of the philosophical and constitutional language of the nineteenth
century, or that one must underpin this misleading account with a theoretical
infrastructure derived from nineteenth-century social and political theory."
NIKOLAS ROSE, POWERS OF FREEDOM: REFRAMING POLITICAL THOUGHT 17-18
(1999). Governance includes "any program, discourse, or strategy that attempts
to alter or shape the actions of others or oneself." BARBARA CRUIKSHANK, THE
WILL TO EMPOWER: DEMOCRATIC CITIZENS AND OTHER SUBJECTS 4 (1999).
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change takes place. Realists sought to debunk symbols;
Arnold sought to understand and use them to reshape the
public's beliefs. Reading and, as the epigraph notes,
"clipping" the legal, political, and popular literature of his
time, Arnold sought "[a]n emotional comprehension of a
science about law" instead of a realist or formalist "science
of law. '
Symbols and Folklore also departed from realism in
their mocking criticism of elite and popular ideologies.
Before Fred Rodell began making a career out of it,6 Arnold
served as the legal academy's court jester, tweaking the
pretensions of legal formalism and the legal professoriate
by likening the dominant "jurisprudence" of his time to a
"shining but unfulfilled dream of a world governed by
reason."' Working attorneys may appreciate the existence of
the jurisprudential dream, he explained, but they hope
their sons don't waste their time studying the subject in law
school.8 His irony extended to the pretensions of governing
ideology generally. Whereas primitive cultures base their
rational laws on irrational, "magical" premises, modern
capitalist democracies suffer irrational legal and political
regimes constructed through hyper-rational theories and
deliberation:9
In our rational and sophisticated age the Devil and Hell become
very complicated. The true faith is Capitalism. Its priests are
lawyers and economists. The Devil consists of an abstract man
called a demagogue. He is the kind of person who refuses to be
moved by sound economists and lawyers and who is constantly
misleading the people by making the worse appear the better
reason.
Arnold did not merely propose a theory distinct from
realism; he combined a detached social scientific analysis of
the symbols of governance with a detached, ironic voice.
Together, his approach and voice suggested that the
intellectually and functionally efficacious reformer must
5. Thurman W. Arnold, Book Review, 36 COLUM. L. REv. 687, 690 (1936).
6. See FRED RODELL, WOE UNTO You, LAWYERS! (1939); Neil Duxbury, In the
Twilight of Legal Realism: Fred Rodell and the Limits of Legal Critique, 11
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 354 (1991).
7. SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 57-59.
8. Id. at 59.
9. Id. at 4.
10. FOLKLORE, supra note 3, at 5.
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operate within the symbols of governance while remaining
sufficiently removed to note those symbols' contingent
construction and emptiness of meaning. He could speak to
intellectual and popular audiences outside the traditional
confines of legal academia and present himself and his
ideas as the modern, humorous antidote to a stultifying
legal, political, and economic common sense.
Symbols and Folklore are historically important efforts
to consider the implications of legal realism and 1930s-era
qualitative social sciences for the study of the symbols of
law specifically and governance generally. In them, Arnold
decentered law and traditional legal-and even
traditionally legal realist-objects and methods in the study
of governance, an effort that continues today in the "Law
and" scholarship that proliferates throughout the legal
academy and social sciences.11 To the extent that "we are all
legal realists now,"12  Symbols and Folklore remain
significant as early post-realist works that engaged in a
wide-ranging interdisciplinary inquiry into law's place
within a wider cultural, social, and political context than
legal academia typically considered. As such, Symbols and
Folklore ask many of the same questions regarding law's
significance and signifying practices that scholars continue
to consider.
This is not to say that Arnold's monographs were an
unqualified success. Their ultimate failure to establish a
coherent and recognizable field of inquiry with a replicable
methodology demonstrates not only the limits of Arnold's
approach, but also the limits of the social sciences from
which he drew. This failure helps explain the waning of his
reputation. Despite the prominence of his career-which
included stints as a Yale Law School professor, a federal
appeals court judge, a New Deal "trustbuster," and a co-
founder of the Washington D.C. firm Arnold, Fortas &
Porter (later renamed Arnold & Porter after one of its
partners moved to the Supreme Court)"3-his work has not
11. See Arthur A. Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L. J. 989 (1978) (meditating on
law's complex relationship with the webs of human culture, and on the
inevitably proliferating human efforts to study the relationship).
12. Joseph William Singer, Review Essay, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L.
REV. 465, 467 (1988).
13. Accounts of Arnold's life appear in his autobiography, THURMAN ARNOLD,
FAIR FIGHTS AND FOUL (1965), in Spencer Weber Waller, The Short Unhappy
Judgeship of Thurman Arnold, 3 Wyo. L. REV. 233 (2003) as well as in the
1056 [Vol. 51
2003] SYMBOLS OF GOVERNANCE 1057
received the attention that other realists have garnered.14
When they discuss him at all, contemporary legal
commentators chide Arnold for his intolerance and
arrogance," his "abiding social conservatism ' " and his
intellectual "attention span of a two-year-old. 1 7 As a legal
theorist, he is considered an outlier, a representative of a
"peripheral or radical strand" of the realist movement
whose current relevance lies largely in its indirect influence
on Critical Legal Studies. 8 More often, contemporary
scholars quote instances of his caustic, amusing critique of
the unquestioned assumptions of legal formalism without
placing such quips within his larger academic and political
project. This Article is an effort to provide both the
intellectual context of Arnold's work and, through his work,
a better sense of where and how the study of law turned
after realism.
The Article is in five parts. Part I describes Arnold's
relationship with legal realism, looking at the earliest part
of his academic career when, as a mainstream realist, he
introduction to a collection of his letters, GENE M. GRESSLEY, Introduction,
VOLTAIRE AND THE COWBOY: THE LETTERS OF THURMAN ARNOLD 1-94 (Gene M.
Gressley ed., 1977), and in EDWARD N. KEARNY, THURMAN ARNOLD, SOCIAL
CRITIC 39-62 (1970).
14. Arnold has not been the subject of a full-length biography, while his
work is generally marginalized within histories of legal realism and has not
even been the principal subject of an article in an American law review in thirty
years.
15. See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 240-41
(1995).
16. Ayer, supra note 2, at 1052.
17. Schlegel, supra note 2, at 512 n.264 (1979). But see Laura Kalman,
Eating Spaghetti with a Spoon, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1547, 1557 (1997) (reviewing
DUXBURY, supra note 15) (praising Arnold's work as "provocative," his
personality as "compelling," and his personal letters as "lively").
18. Duxbury, supra note 2, at 12, 39-41.
19. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE
L.J. 573, 593 (1998) (quoting Arnold's sarcastic description of the negotiations
surrounding corporate reorganizations); Anthony V. Baker, "So Extraordinary,
So Unprecedented an Authority": A Conceptual Reconsideration of the Singular
Doctrine of Judicial Review, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 729, 729 n.2 (2001) (citing Arnold's
sarcastic description of the Supreme Court as a "great Delphic oracle"); Herbert
A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators,
104 YALE L.J. 763, 805 (1995) (quoting Arnold's description of how, for New
Deal opponents, the Constitution had become "a sort of abracadabra which
would cure all disease"); Eric Talley, Precedential Cascades: An Appraisal, 73 S.
CAL. L. REV. 87, 108 & n.68 (1999) (citing Arnold, among other realists, for his
critique of the insincerity of judicial decision-making).
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performed empirical studies of local and state court
systems. It then traces his shift towards the theoretical
wing of realism as he began to attack the contradictions
and failings of classical legal formalism, and as he extended
realism beyond its focus on private common law doctrines to
a critique of formalist conceptions of public and
constitutional law, with an emphasis on defending the
constitutional authority of New Deal administrative
agencies. It closes by explicating Arnold's critique of realism
in Symbols and Folklore, where he condemned realists'
inability to grasp the fundamental role that formal concepts
play in modern society and governance.
The subject of Part II is Arnold's proposed field of
"Political Dynamics," an interdisciplinary approach to the
symbols of law, politics, and economics. I closely trace
Arnold's promiscuous use of the social sciences prevalent
during the interwar years, especially the study of political
propaganda and ideologies, anthropology, and institutional
economics. Part III considers Arnold's authorial voice in
Symbols and Folklore, which established him as an ironic
observer of the odd, self-destructive folkways of 1930s
American governance. A pastiche of popular Menckenesque
commentator, critical and qualitative social scientist, and
New Deal proponent, the Arnold of Symbols and Folklore
differed sharply from his realist contemporaries. Focusing
on two areas of legal doctrine and practice that Arnold
studied in Symbols and Folklore, Part IV explains how
Arnold applied his theory to the criminal trial and to the
emerging field of administrative law (or, more specifically,
the judicial review of administrative agencies). In both
instances, Arnold focused not merely on the functional and
instrumental value of realist law reform and enforcement,
but also considered the way governing institutions struggle
over the meaning of the symbols that condition their very
existence and operations.
While remarkably prescient in its self-reflexivity,
Arnold's expansive critique of realism was distinguished by
significant blindspots. I appraise these in Part V,
concentrating on his anti-democratic tendencies and the
limitations of his often ham-fisted critical approach.
Arnold's weaknesses were symptomatic not only of his own
shortcomings as a critic and scholar, but also of the legal
realism and social sciences from which he drew.
Throughout this Article and especially in the Conclusion, I
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consider Arnold's value as an historical figure and make
two claims. First, to the extent that Arnold both built on
and broke from his realist colleagues, Symbols and Folklore
force us to consider the limits of realism's continuing
relevance as a foundation of contemporary scholarship.
Second, in his ironic and accessible monographs, Arnold
established a critical public voice for the legal academic;
that voice remains a compelling, if limited, model for legal
scholarship that hopes to intervene in the public sphere.
Ultimately, the monographs' position within the narrative
of American legal theory provides both an inspiring account
of cross-disciplinary inquiry and a cautionary tale of
interdisciplinarity's perils.
I. ARNOLD AND REALISM
Despite his protestations to the contrary," Arnold is
generally considered a realist.21 He arrived at Yale, one of
realism's core strongholds, in 1930,22 having already
produced a coherent, social science-influenced series of
studies of civil court procedure.23 Soon after his arrival in
New Haven, his work began to shift from the empirical
realism of his pre-Yale articles to a mode of realism focused
more on theoretical and doctrinal issues.24 This shift was
20. See infra Part I.C.
21. See sources cited supra note 2.
22. See GRESSLEY, supra note 13, at 29.
23. See generally Ayer, supra note 2, at 1058-64 (describing work from the
early period of Arnold's career as adopting "the ideology of procedural reform
Schlegel, supra note 2, at 511-12, 569-70 & n.589, 585 (describing Arnold's
recruitment by Yale); see, e.g., Thurman Arnold, The Collection of Judicial
Statistics in West Virginia, 36 W.VA. L.Q. 184 (1930) (describing project of
collecting information on all cases coming before lower courts to aid in efforts in
court reform); Thurman Arnold, Judicial Councils, 35 W.VA. L.Q. 193, 194
(1929) (describing as common goal of judges and the bar to administer justice
"efficiently, speedily and economically"); Thurman Arnold et al., Report to the
Committee on Judicial Administration and Legal Reform of the West Virginia
Bar Association Containing Suggestions Concerning Pleading and Practice in
West Virginia, 36 W.VA. L.Q. 1, 10 (1929) (promoting formation of judicial
councils to study West Virginia courts "with a view of improving the
administration of justice, and submit reform suggestions to the courts").
24. See KALMAN, supra note 2, at 34-35 (1986); Schlegel, supra note 2, at
511-12, 569-70 & n.589, 585; see also Duxbury, supra note 2, at 19 (attributing
Arnold's shift to interdisciplinary theoretical work to his opportunism);
TWINING, supra note 2, at 67-69 (1973) (using Arnold as a central example of the
differences between Columbia Law School's empirical strain of realism in the
2003] 1059
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itself within the mainstream of realism, especially as it was
practiced at Yale, where the leading realists moved away
from social science and towards doctrinal theory and
critique .25
Articles from his early (i.e., pre-monograph) Yale period
included attacks upon the then-prevailing Langdellian legal
formalism'6 as well as more specific critiques of prevailing
doctrinal conceptions of trust law, criminal attempts, and
the relationship between substantive and procedural law.27
late 1920s and the strain of realism that Yale exemplified in the 1930s, which
was more explicitly political, more interested in the rules of civil procedure, and
more influenced by psychology and psychiatry). On the distinction between
realism's empirical and theoretical tendencies, see infra notes 31, 35 and
accompanying text.
25. See JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL
SOCIAL SCIENCE 19 (1995) (noting that only Underhill Moore would undertake a
major empirical research project after 1933); John Henry Schlegel, The Ten
Thousand Dollar Question, 41 STAN. L. REV. 435, 462 (1989) (reviewing
KALMAN, supra note 2) (noting the shift among the Yale realists).
26. I use the term "formalism" to refer to the "classical orthodox" theory of
legal thought of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century most closely
associated with Harvard Law School Dean Christopher Langdell. See Thomas
C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983). The classical
orthodox theory aspired to a quasi-scientific, comprehensive, complete, formal,
and conceptually ordered system based upon a small number of principles from
which a large number of rules, found and utilized in established precedents, can
be derived. See WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF
MODERN AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION 70-78 (1994); Wai-Chee Dimock, Rules of
Law, Laws of Science, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 203, 204-09 (2001); Martin P.
Golding, Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy in Twentieth-Century America-
Major Themes and Developments, 36 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 441, 442-43 (1986); Grey,
supra, at 7-13. Despite the analytical distinction between "formalist" theories,
which strive for highly predictive rule- or principle-bound decisions, and
"conceptualist" theories, which strive for a legal system based upon a small
number of principles and concepts (see Grey, supra, at 9-10), my use of the term
"formalism" is intended to reflect the historic use of the term to represent the
classical orthodox theory, and its continued use by diverse historians and legal
theorists. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 66-67
(1983) (describing realists' opposition to formalism, and decrying continuing
resistance to all notions of formalism); GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL
MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END 24-25 (1995)
(presenting history of "modern conceptual jurisprudence" as reaction to
"formalism"); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 39-41
(1990) (describing competing definitions and uses of the term "formalism").
27. See Thurman Arnold, The Role of Substantive Law and Procedure in the
Legal Process, 45 HARV. L. REV. 617 (1932) [hereinafter Arnold, Substantive
Law and Procedure]; Thurman Arnold, The Restatement of the Law of Trusts, 31
COLUM. L. REV. 800, (1931) [hereinafter Arnold, Trusts]; Thurman Arnold,
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Therefore, although Arnold was not among the most visible
legal realists during the early 1930s and was not even
among those named in Karl Llewellyn's legendary lists, 28
his 1930s work, including Symbols and Folklore and the
articles leading up to those two monographs, must be
understood as rooted in and reacting to legal realism.
A. Arnold's Realism
The realism to which Arnold responded29 was based on
two core assertions: first, that formalism and "all dogmas
Criminal Attempts-The Rise and Fall of an Abstraction, 40 YALE L.J. 53 (1930)
[hereinafter Arnold, Criminal Attempts].
28. See Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30
COLUM. L. REV. 431, 454 (1930); Karl Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-
Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARv. L. REV. 1222 (1931) [hereinafter
Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism]. The story behind Arnold's invisibility
on these lists is telling. After Roscoe Pound's critique of realism appeared in
1931 (see Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV.
697 (1931)), following Llewellyn's A Realistic Jurisprudence articles and the list
included therein, Arnold was one of the recipients of an appeal sent by
Llewellyn and Jerome Frank seeking assistance in developing a reply to Pound.
At least one historian speculates that Arnold never responded. See Ayer, supra
note 2, at 1065 & n.76. Nevertheless, following his correspondence with Pound,
Llewellyn attempted to add Arnold's name to the list in the following year's
Some Realism About Realism article. Arnold requested that he not be included
in the later list, however, and Llewellyn complied. N. E. H. HULL, ROSCOE
POUND AND KARL LLEWELLYN: SEARCHING FOR AN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 211-
12 (1997). In his private correspondence with Pound, Arnold continued to
express discomfort with being identified as a realist, at least through 1935. See
id. at 247. This apparent private ambivalence was consistent with Arnold's
published work in the mid- and late-1930s, which claims to break with realism.
See infra Part I.C. By the end of his life, however, Arnold was more than willing
to describe himself as a member of Yale's group of realists from the time of his
arrival in New Haven. See ARNOLD, FAIR FIGHTS AND FOUL, supra note 13, at 54-
70.
29. My purpose here is not to summarize the diverse work of legal realism-
a largely impossible project, as realists, opponents of realism, and contemporary
historians have concluded and demonstrated. See, e.g., DUXBURY, supra note
15, at 65-71 (1995) (describing difficulty of defining realism, and failure of
earlier attempts to do so); L. L. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L.
REV. 429, 430 (1934) (criticizing realism by focusing on Llewellyn's work
because of the movement's heterogeneity); Llewellyn, Some Realism About
Realism, supra note 28, at 1254 (1931) (denying existence of coherent realist
"school"). Nor is it to accept or reject John Henry Schlegel's contention that
realism must be understood in the institutional context of the interwar legal
academy rather than as a school of jurisprudence. See SCHLEGEL, supra note 25,
at 6-8. Rather, what follows is a description of those tendencies of the general
intellectual project identified as realism to which Arnold's work contributed and
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and devices that cannot be translated into terms of actual
experience" must be rejected; and second, that a functional
approach must replace formalism to rebuild legal doctrines
that would reflect and be relevant to the presumed "real" of
law in practice or action.3' As Robert Gordon has explained,
the realist conception of "evolutionary functionalism"
assumes both the inherent superiority of the modern liberal
capitalism towards which Western societies had been
"evolving," and "that the natural and proper function of a
legal system is to facilitate such an evolution."32 Realism's
functionalist approach strove to understand law "in terms
of [law's] factual context and economic and social
consequences"; as such, it was an attempt to peer behind
and ultimately discard formalism's abstractions in order to
find, explain, and make law relevant to realities that lurked
in the knowable world beyond the foggy mists of formal
legal doctrines.3 3 As with its critique of formalism, realism's
functionalist agenda was an extension of similar tendencies
in sociological jurisprudence towards a "pragmatic
instrumentalism." ' Realists understood this functionalist
approach in part as the basis for a social scientific study of
law that would "demand observation and study of the
actual structure and functioning of modern social, economic,
and political life."'"
from which Arnold claimed ultimately to break. In this sense, I do assume the
existence of a discernible "realism," but am as interested in Arnold's
understanding of what that realism was as I am in what it may, or may not,
have actually been.
30. Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 809, 822 (1935).
31. See generally DUXBURY, supra note 15, at 132-33 (arguing that not all
realists were functionalists); KALMAN, supra note 2, at 3 (distinguishing
between negative and positive sides of realism); Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of
American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1220-26 (1985) (distinguishing between
legal realism's "deconstructive, debunking strand" and its consequentialist or
"constructive" strand).
32. Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 59
(1984).
33. KALMAN, supra note 2, at 3.
34. See generally ROBERT SAMUEL SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND
AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY (1982) (drawing connections between the realists and
Gray, Holmes, and Pound, as well as John Dewey).
35. Walter W. Cook, Scientific Method and the Law, 13 A.B.A. J. 303, 308
(1927); see, e.g., William 0. Douglas, A Functional Approach to the Law of
Business Associations, 23 ILL. L. REV. 673 (1929) (declaring that the study and
reform of business organizations law should focus on "the organization and
1062 [Vol. 51
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In place of its formalist bate noire, realism claimed to
offer a modern and progressive approach to legal forms and
practices that was both epistemologically distinct from legal
formalism and more engaged in the politics of its time.6 As
part of their reconstructive project of finding and studying
the law in society, realists privileged the study of law as a
part of society, rather than as an isolated phenomenon and
intellectual pursuit. They focused on social and economic
"facts" rather than on timeless concepts, and studied law's
operations more than its forms.37 More broadly, realists
sought to abandon the formalist project of collecting and
teaching a singular legal taxonomy in favor of scholarship
and pedagogy that would be more relevant to legal
practice.3 ' Furthermore, realists generally allied themselves
with the progressive liberalism of the 1930s-itself
historically related to the already-established Progressive
tradition in legal thought associated with the work of Oliver
Wendell Holmes and the early Roscoe Pound-which was
poised in the mid-1930s to assume an intimate relationship
with the New Deal.39
Two important conclusions that follow from realism's
critical and reconstructive project are central to Arnold's
work. First, the judicial and academic effort required to fill
the inevitable gaps and indeterminacy of legal rules
operation of a business [rather] than [on] the mere form itself of business"). On
realism's difficult relationship with social science disciplines and methodologies,
see generally SCHLEGEL, supra note 25. On the epistemological differences
between the social science and theoretical wings of realism, see, for example,
TWINING, supra note 2, at 195-96 (describing how Llewellyn, who was more
closely identified with the theoretical wing of realism, was ambivalent towards
social scientific approaches to law); Hessel E. Yntema, The Implications of Legal
Science, 10 N.Y.U. L.Q. 279, 309 (1933) (describing split between social
scientific and theoretical branches of realism, and dismissing the latter in favor
of the former).
36. See AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, at xiii-xiv (William W. Fisher et al. eds.,
1993).
37. KALMAN, supra note 2, at 37-38. Because of its embrace of "facts" and
"results" instead of absolute standards of judgment, realism has been
characterized as relativistic. See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF
DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 43
(1973). On similar, and worse, charges against Arnold, see infra Part V.
38. See Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV.
907 (1933); Roscoe Pound et al., What Constitutes a Good Legal Education, 7
AM. L. SCH. REV. 887, 894 (1933).
39. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-
1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 169-70 (1992).
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revealed as false the presumption that a rule of law above
men and without human intervention was possible, much
less desirable. ° Second, realists generally rejected the
pervasive early twentieth-century "legal-economic myth"
that distinguished the presumptively free, private realm of
the marketplace from the inherent coercion of government
intervention, and that sought to protect the former from the
latter.41 To Arnold and the realists, this observation led to
the conclusion that law, and its private corollary, the
market, are human institutions subject to uneven political
and economic influence. In this regard, Arnold shared with
other realists-and especially with Robert Hale-as well as
with the institutionalist economists of the early twentieth-
century (including Thorstein Veblen, John Commons,
Adolph Berle, and Gardiner Means) a substantive
intellectual and political agenda that assumed law to be
subject to change and intervention, and capable of
instrumental use for progressive ends.42
Arnold's earliest published articles from his tenure at
Yale enacted the familiar realist trope of demonstrating the
illogic and impracticality of legal conceptualism, and
provided the typical realist call for a more functionalist
approach to specific legal problems. In "The Restatement of
40. PURCELL, supra note 37, at 88; see also Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal
Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 269, 277-78
(1997) (contrasting what he terms realism's "core claim," that "judges respond
primarily to the stimulus of facts" when deciding cases, with the formalist
commitment to "the descriptive claim that judges respond primarily-indeed,
perhaps exclusively-to the rational demands of the applicable rules of law and
modes of reasoning").
41. See DUXBURY, supra note 15, at 106-11; Kalman, supra note 17, at 1559
(reviewing DUXBURY, supra note 15); Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism
Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 487-91 (1988) (book review); HORWITZ, supra note 39,
at 207.
42. See BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE:
ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 9-15, 210 (1998);
Neil Duxbury, Robert Hale and the Economy of Legal Force, 53 MOD. L. REV.
421 (1990). Hale, an economist by training and a professor at Columbia Law
School from 1919-1949, was instrumental among the realists in developing this
latter argument. See FRIED, supra, at 3, 210; Robert L. Hale, Coercion and
Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923);
Robert L. Hale, Force and the State: A Comparison of "Political" and "Economic"
Compulsion, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 149 (1935). For a discussion of Hale's relevance
for contemporary legal theory, see DUNCAN KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING, ETC. 83-
125 (1993). On institutional economics and its influence on Arnold, see infra
notes 162-181 and accompanying text.
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the Law of Trusts," Arnold condemned the recently issued
Restatement of Trusts for its construction of a "system of
abstractions" based upon complicated and inappropriate
common law rules, and proposed in its stead a proper-and
properly realist-approach that would entirely reconsider
whether the "ancient language of trusts" was at all practical
"in solving modern problems."43 In "Criminal Attempts-
The Rise and Fall of an Abstraction," he criticized the
formalist tendency to "reformulate ... rules," make broad
and vague generalizations, and create "elaborate logical
machinery for sorting ... dissimilar situations."" He
proposed a new approach to understanding and
adjudicating criminal attempts based on the underlying
substantive crime. 5 As he explained in "Law Enforcement-
An Attempt at Social Dissection," his general project at this
juncture of his career was to "unite the study of law in
action with law in books" by enabling not only the
production of functional legal forms and concepts, but also
"the study of these very principles once they are
formulated."'
Arnold continued to demonstrate these familiar realist
tendencies in Symbols, in which he included revised
versions of a number of his recent articles. Symbols also
extended the realist critique to attack a more abstract
notion of formalist "jurisprudence"-a straw man Arnold
constructed (largely without the benefit of examples) that
served as a symbol of the general assumptions of classic
legal formalism. 8 Arnold sardonically defined "jurispru-
43. Arnold, Trusts, supra note 27, at 803, 806. Arnold provided a more
general critique of the Restatement project as a whole in Institute Priests and
Yale Observers-A Reply to Dean Goodrich, 84 U. PA. L. REV. 811 (1936).
44. Arnold, Criminal Attempts, supra note 27.
45. Id.
46. See Thurman W. Arnold, Law Enforcement-An Attempt at Social
Dissection, 42 YALE L.J. 1, 23 (1932) [hereinafter Arnold, Law Enforcement]; see
also Arnold, Criminal Attempts, supra note 27, at 58, 79-80 (decrying
formalism's "useless and misleading" logic, and calling for courts "to get rid of
useless abstractions and to reclassify the situations which come before them for
judgment"). See generally Ayer, supra note 2, at 1066-68.
47. See, SYMBOLS, supra note 3, ch. 3 (revision of Arnold, Apologia for
Jurisprudence, 44 YALE L. J. 729 (1935) [hereinafter Arnold, Apologia]); id. at
ch. 7 (revision of Arnold, Law Enforcement, supra note 46); id. at ch. 8 (revision
of Arnold, Trial by Combat and the New Deal, 47 HARv. L. REV. 913 (1934)
[hereinafter Arnold, Trial by Combat]); id. at ch. 9 (included portions of Arnold,
Substantive Law and Procedure, supra note 27).
48. Arnold, Law Enforcement, supra note 46, at 23.
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dence" as "the science of that great symmetrical body of
principles which is supposed to constitute the law, the
description of its deepest sources and the unifying element
of the law throughout history."'' Because "jurisprudence"
claimed to perform the impossible function of reconciling
the internal contradictions and indeterminacies of law
within a grand system of human endeavor, Arnold
dismissed it as largely wishful thinking. 9 And because it
failed to admit what for Arnold was obvious-that legal
doctrines cannot be made consistent, least of all in a
complex modern world-jurisprudence was merely a series
of "ceremonial observances" rather than a systematic
project based upon "scientific observations."51
Arnold's acerbic anti-formalism faulted equally
conservative and liberal practitioners of jurisprudence.
Conservative legal theorists relied upon abstract principles
to defend what he considered, during the Depression, to be
an unjust, inefficient, and ultimately inoperative economic
system, while liberal legal theorists relied upon equally
abstract ideas to construct utopian images of a perfect
society. 2 Placid conservatives and foolish liberals both
considered the integrity of their outdated systems of legal
thought to be more important than the practical solutions
Arnold felt were necessary to solve the real problems of the
Depression.53 Thus, all law reform movements would fail,
Arnold argued, if they remained based on "a general
examination and restatement of general principles," rather
than on a properly realist "constant attempt to formulate
and clarify rules and directions."54
49. SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 46.
50. See, e.g., id. at 56 (describing jurisprudence as "the effort to construct a
logical heaven behind the courts, wherein contradictory ideals are made to seem
consistent").
51. Id. at 70; see id. at 46 (distinguishing jurisprudence "from another way
of thinking which may be described as practical, or benevolent, which produces
entirely different social results").
52. See FOLKLORE, supra note 3 at 224.
53. See SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 2; see also id. at 19 (noting similar
parallels between conservative and liberal economists).
54. Id. at 84.
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B. Arnold's Extension of Realism
In Symbols and Folklore, which extended realists'
functionalist critique of formalism to advocacy on behalf of
the New Deal, Arnold applied realism to legal doctrines and
practices besides private substantive law and civil
procedure, the main objects of realism's focus.5" Both
monographs specifically attacked formalistic dogmas that
he considered to be in the way of necessary New Deal
efforts, including legal formalist approaches to public law
and to economists' inability to consider actual economic
conditions that their theories were unable to predict or
explain. Arnold's critique of public law was not simply
intended to enable a more functional legal practice, but to
enable a more efficient economy and society.
Arnold's hard-core functionalism, which was
fundamental to Folklore and Symbols, shaped his blithely
utilitarian definition of a governing regime's efficiency:
[Iun order to make judgments as to whether any activity is a good
or a bad thing, it is necessary to have standards. For the time
being we are adopting the standard that it is a good thing to
produce and distribute as much goods as the inventive and
organizing genius of man makes possible.
Although this seemed to him the common sense goal of
governance, he recognized that not all governing
55. Symbols and Folklore focused on administrative, see infra Part IV-B,
tax, see SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 116; FOLKLORE, supra note 3, ch. 12, and
antitrust law, see FOLKLORE, supra note 3, ch. 9, which are bodies of public law
that realists ignored or underplayed.
56. SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 102-03.
57. FOLKLORE, supra note 3, at 177; see also SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 266-
67 (arguing that functional, temporal governance was the most important goal
of government and the basis of a "new humanitarian creed" he hoped would
sweep the U.S.); KEARNY, supra note 13, at 136 (noting efficient and fair
production and distribution of goods as Arnold's explicit normative standard).
Arnold's "standard" is closer to a utilitarian norm than it is to the classic
definition of "wealth maximization" as maximizing the dollar (or dollar
equivalent) value of "everything in society." Richard Posner, Utilitarianism,
Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 119 (1979). Critiques of
Posner's definition and use of the concept of wealth maximization include:
Robin F. Grant, Judge Richard Posner's Wealth Maximization Principle:
Another Form of Utilitarianism?, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 815 (1989), Anthony T.
Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 227
(1980), and Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Midas Touch: The Lethal Effect of Wealth
Maximization, 1999 WIs. L. REV. 687 (1999).
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institutions sought this end directly. In explaining this odd,
but apparently common, irrationality, he distinguished
between the "temporal" and "spiritual" planes of
governance. For Arnold, the temporal constituted the
privileged, practical realm where actors achieve mutual
goals-"the stage on which the ideals of society are given
concrete reality."58 Opposed to the temporal, the "spiritual"
approach was for Arnold the stage upon which a society's
ideals remain in the misty universe of formalist principles,
and where professional and armchair philosophers obsess
over the future, debate logical principles, and wage "holy
wars" between different economic and political models. 9
Because the "stage" on which it performed was largely
outside of public view, temporal, practical government could
be fluid and dynamic, and could "muddl[e] through" crises
by experimentation without the pretense of consistency and
devotion to regressive and limiting principles."
Arnold concluded that an effective regime must perform
efficiently on the temporal plane by mastering the technical
and practical tasks of distributing goods to its citizens and
increasing overall social wealth. As Douglas Ayer has
explained, Arnold's quest for more functional legal doctrines
in his early work, which was consistent with his later
explicit advocacy on behalf of the New Deal, arose from his
"efficiency-oriented reform effort ... [that] sought to
prevent the waste of natural and human resources by
maximizing the production and distribution of goods."
Arnold predicted that Americans would ultimately embrace
the New Deal's "new economic creed" and "social ideals,"
which were based "on the belief that there exists a huge
reservoir of technical skill, capable of running a great
productive machine with new energy and efficiency." He
explicitly promoted the New Deal's efforts to bring the
"great productive machine" into being as a necessary
58. FOLKLORE, supra note 3, at 127.
59. Id. at 14, 20, 42; SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 126-27.
60. SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 2, 123.
61. Ayer, supra note 2, at 1077. The New Deal was not the only regime he
appreciated for its attention to his vision of efficiency; Arnold also celebrated
what he claimed was the disreputable and sub rosa practical government that
existed under the "spiritual government" of economic and legal formality, as
well as certain aspects of fascist and totalitarian regimes in statements that
would become standard parts of critiques of his work. See infra Part V.
62. SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 266-67.
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response to the Depression. He argued that a complex
modern society of private institutions-or, as he called it,
"an industrial feudalism"-had produced an economic crisis
and then failed to respond to the plight of the legions of
unemployed workers the crisis had produced.63 Like the
realists, he sought modern, practical solutions to the
conservative, conceptual morass of formalism in all its
instantiations.
C. The Break from Realism
Arnold's break from realism and attempt to bring an
interdisciplinary, interpretive approach to the study of law,
politics, and economics ultimately distinguishes him from
other realists and legal theorists of his time.64 In Symbols
and Folklore, he moved away from a legal-centric vision of
anti-formalist realism that studied the gap between what
courts say they do and what they actually do, and towards a
more comprehensive critique of formalist rhetoric and
practice in all political, social, and economic institutions.
65
63. Id. at 106-07; see also id. at 114 (predicting that as "[t]he new
administrative machine... gradually acquir[es] competence," resistance to the
New Deal would fade away).
64. Even late in life, his academic career long behind him, Arnold
emphasized interdisciplinarity as realism's key innovation. In a review of
Wilfrid Rumble's early history of legal realism written during the last year of
Arnold's life, Arnold claimed that the realists' turn to other academic
disciplines, including psychology, anthropology, and economics, was their most
important response to the crisis of legal formalism's legitimacy. See Thurman
W. Arnold, Book Review, 84 POL. ScI. Q. 668, 669 (1969) (reviewing WILFRID E.
RUMBLE, JR., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM: SKEPTICISM, REFORM, AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS (1968)).
65. See Felix Cohen, Book Review, in THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE: SELECTED
PAPERS OF FELIX S. COHEN 442, 446 (Lucy Kramer Cohen ed. 1960) (reviewing
FOLKLORE, supra note 3) (reprinting 1 NAT'L LAW. GUILD Q. 161 (1938)). Arnold's
effort to conceptualize government and capitalism as driven by "symbols" and
"folklore" appeared in his work before the publication of Symbols. See Arnold,
Law Enforcement, supra note 46, at 24 (describing main purpose of courts as
dramatizing law enforcement, rather than actually enforcing the law); Arnold,
Substantive Law and Procedure, supra note 27, at 646 (describing operations of
judicial institutions as similar to "the presentation of a play"). Nevertheless,
these earlier articles focused mainly on particular issues or legal doctrines and
included suggested reforms, while Symbols and Folklore operate at a higher
level of abstraction by collecting individual studies and placing them within an
overarching theoretical apparatus. See SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 127
(introducing Chapters 6-9 as case studies detailing the functions of the civil and
criminal trial). Symbols, for example, places a revised version of Arnold's 1934
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Arnold cast himself in Folklore as a diagnostician seeking to
understand and explain the context and pathologies of the
political debates of the mid- to late-1930s, and, ultimately,
to intervene on the side of the New Deal.66 Indeed, he
described his project in Folklore as an attempt to
understand the crisis in capitalism and "to explain the
ideological difficulties which prevent the creating of
organizations which will give that protection."67 If a regime
wished to succeed on the temporal plane, he argued, it could
not simply ignore the spiritual plane. A diagnosis of what
he called "the taboos and customs of the tribe"-the
symptoms of the dominant political culture that structure
political discourse and extend into all of a society's
institutions-was a necessary prerequisite to a properly
functional, practical solution to the Depression or any other
crisis or problem faced by modern society.8 Arnold therefore
proposed a shift from the mere critique of law's surface
forms and practices, or its temporal inefficiencies, to an
inquiry into the deeper spiritual, symbolic forms and
practices that shape "Law" as a field of governance.
This shift led Arnold away from realism. Realism's
reformist anti-formalism, he believed, blinded it to the
pervasiveness of symbols in the discourse of law and
governance generally. Although its debunking of
formalism's most deeply held attachments to concepts and
rules enabled a better understanding of law and other basic
principles of governance and economics, realism unfairly
assumed attorneys and ordinary laypeople to be
"unconscious hypocrites" or "dupes,"" and therefore resulted
article on the emerging New Deal, which itself considers the symbolic,
institutional, and psychological causes of judicial resistance to the New Deal, in
the context of his more extensive development of a cultural institutionalist
approach in the monograph. See Arnold, Trial by Combat, supra note 47, at 931-
34, 945-47; SYMBOLS, supra note 3, ch. 8. Similarly, Symbols places his critique
of jurisprudence that originally appeared in Arnold, Apologia, supra note 47,
within the monograph's broader arguments regarding government generally
and alongside the monograph's narrower discussion of particular areas of law
and governance. See SYMBOLS, supra note 3, ch. 3.
66. FOLKLORE, supra note 3, at 205.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 7. Ironically, Arnold's critics would maintain
that Arnold himself suffered from the same elitist assumptions about the
malleability of the mass political will. See infra Part V.
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in "making the world look unpleasant. 7 ° Arnold also tried
to understand governance and economics as sets of symbolic
constructions whose meaning opposing groups attempted to
define to their respective advantages. Realists and their
counterparts in other disciplines erroneously assumed the
possibility of a new order devoid of formal, overarching
"symbols," where accurate and workable methods of
organizing and resolving factual problems would lead to a
modernh functional, and transparent legal and political
system. But symbols were central to governance generally,
and to law in particular. No matter how effective, reform
could not eradicate folklore. 2
To be disillusioned with the judicial, political, and
popular attachment to foolish principles and symbols is
"futile," Arnold argued. 3 "So long as our belief in rational
moral government depends upon the law, it must continue
to balance logically the contradictory ideals which that
government must express. 74 Instead, the correct diagnostic
approach is first to "recognize" the necessary frailty that
leads humans to cling to folklore and second, to "utilize"
that frailty for political ends.75 Debunking was merely a
first step towards a greater political goal. And Arnold
specifically sought to utilize the spiritual plane to advocate
in favor of the functional programs of the New Deal that
operated on the temporal plane." Arnold's break from
realism therefore was based on his assumption that the
effective "diagnostician" must understand the symbolic and
institutional context of formalism's great and ongoing
70. SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 6. In a letter to Harold Laski dated January 9,
1936, Arnold associated the unpleasant, extreme "hardboiled" position with the
realist Walter Wheeler Cook. See GRESSLEY, supra note 13, at 217 (reprinting
letter from Arnold to Harold J. Laski, Jan. 9, 1936). Cook, who "alone among
the Realists... had a well worked out understanding of what it was to apply
scientific method to law," had left Yale before Arnold's arrival to help establish
the Institute of Justice at Johns Hopkins, where he hoped to develop an
emergent study of law that would be analytic, functional, and committed to
social science. SCHLEGEL, supra note 25, at 228; see also id. at 158 (discussing
Cook's hopes for the Institute of Law).
71. See FOLKLORE, supra note 3, at 131; SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 15.
72. See SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 69.
73. See FOLKLORE, supra note 3, at 131.
74. SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 69.
75. See FOLKLORE, supra note 3, at 161, 343-44.
76. See SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 252.
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success, and must perform her critical and political work
with an awareness of that context.
D. Conclusion
In his functionalist anti-formalism, Arnold drew from
the realism of his contemporaries. But even when his
realism was recognizable as such, Arnold was
unconstrained by realism's traditional domain of private
law. Although he shared his contemporaries' assumptions,
Symbols and Folklore carried realism into new doctrinal
areas of public law and into an anti-formalist critique of
economics. This movement was clearly related to Arnold's
commitment to the New Deal as a political response to the
Depression, and his avowed belief that only through
governmental intervention in the market as regulator and,
possibly, as participant could the current economic and
social crisis be successfully addressed.
Much was at stake. Legal and economic formalism, he
argued in both Symbols and Folklore, did not merely
impede law's functionality; its privileging of "word-symbols"
over governmental responsibility was dangerous to the
health of the republic."7 At the same time that Arnold
moved realism, he was also moving away from realism's
relatively narrow focus on legal doctrines and practice and
towards a broader critique of legal and economic formalism
as symptomatic of a popular need for a symbolic domain of
governance. Law was merely one part of the system of
governance that stood in the way of a functional modernity.
The Depression and New Deal led him to extend realism;
resistance to the New Deal led him ultimately to break from
realism's legal-centric, critical approach. Witnessing the
success opponents to the New Deal enjoyed in frustrating
the Roosevelt administration's efforts to address the
economic and social crises of the Depression, Arnold
recognized the limits of realism's anti-formalism. As
political and social theory and as a reformist program,
realism was too limited and limiting. To replace it, Arnold
sought an approach that could counter formalism on its own
terms by recognizing formalism's persuasive power. I
discuss this approach in Part II.
77. See id. at 118.
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II. POLITICAL DYNAMICS AND THE STUDY OF GOVERNANCE IN
THE SYMBOLIC REALM
This Part summarizes Arnold's critical approach,
developed in Symbols and Folklore, which focused on the
symbols and institutions of governance. He intended his
proposed field of "Political Dynamics" (which he introduced
and described in Folklore) to be "a science about society that
treats its ideals, its literature, its principles of religion, law,
economics, political systems, creeds, and mythologies as
part of a single whole and not as separate subjects, each
with its own independent universe of principles."8 Informed
by new developments in the social sciences, Political
Dynamics was a provocative, critical, and interdisciplinary
conception of legal study as qualitative social science, and of
law and governance as symbolic practice. Both the wide
field he identified as his object of study and the tools he
used to conduct that study were distinct from those of most
realists.79 I begin by discussing what Arnold meant by
"symbols," and then describe how Arnold saw those symbols
as situated within social and ideological institutions.
A. The Symbols of Governance
The titles of Symbols and Folklore made plain Arnold's
shift away from realism. In the notion of the "symbols of
government," Arnold attempted to encapsulate "the
ceremonies and the theories of social institutions," and to
examine them "as symbolic thinking and conduct which
condition the behavior of men in groups."8 He sprinkled
anecdotal examples of symbols throughout the monographs.
78. FOLKLORE, supra note 3, at 349.
79. This distinction is clearest in the differences between Symbols and
Folklore, and a contemporary volume by Huntington Cairns, titled LAW AND THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES (1935). Cairns noted in his introduction both that
interdisciplinary studies were "part of the recognized trend in all departments
of knowledge" during this period, and that a "younger generation" of legal
scholars were "turning with increasing frequency to the social sciences for aid."
Id. at 1, 3. But his book merely catalogs how some social science disciplines
might be applied to the study of law, and generally conceived of legal studies as
a separate pursuit from the study of other subjects. See, e.g., id. at 122 (noting
that economics "has some definite contributions to make to the law"); id. at 160
(noting mutual influences between law and political theory). As I explain infra,
Arnold generally rejects the disciplinary separation on which Cairns relies.
80. SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at iv.
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In Symbols, for example, he illustrated the concept with a
brief discussion of the Tennessee Valley Authority, which
had brought electrical power to rural populations through
an elaborate and ultimately wasteful set of financial and
organizational structures in order to avoid the appearance
of affecting a direct redistribution of wealth. 1 These
structures symbolized a private corporate entity and as
such were necessary for the TVA's existence. Similarly,
Arnold began Folklore with an extensive discussion of how
newspapers, magazines, and other mainstream opinion-
makers utilized the symbolic specters of "Capitalism,
Communism, and Fascism" to limit public intervention in
the market by defining the outer limits of a proper response
to the Depression.82 In both instances, the "dramatic
spectacle" of "political government,"83 the symbols that
define the meaning of any private or public institution,
organized the possibilities and interpretation of governance.
The symbols of governance thus constitute a dynamic
symbolic language and practice by which legal and political
claims made within the dominant legal and political
regimes have meaning and effect.84 As one specific
component of governance, "Law" serves as a "reservoir of
emotionally important social symbols."85 Arnold's claim
relied upon, and emerged from, two key disciplinary
sources, the study of propaganda and anthropology. After
presenting Arnold's approach, I discuss those sources-
which Arnold himself only barely acknowledged in public-
that undergird and also, ultimately, limited "Political
Dynamics" as an historically specific expression of the
assumptions and interests of 1930s social science.
1. Political Dynamics and the Symbols of Governance.
He began by deflating law's pretensions of grandeur and
distinction. Jurisprudence represented for Arnold the
academic field that supported and policed the abstractions
that dominated law, and that won the allegiance of
politicians, jurists, attorneys, and laypeople alike.
Jurisprudence's conception of "Law" as a formal, distinctive
81. SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 16-17.
82. FOLKLORE, supra note 3, at 1-20.
83. Id. at 343-44.
84. See SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 34, 103-04.
85. SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 34.
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system removed from human action was a significant site of
symbolic principles "represent [ing] the belief that there
must be something behind and above government without
which it cannot have permanence or respect."8 As such,
jurisprudence is an enormously productive enterprise
because its practitioners must continually prove the
rationality of "Law"'s consistencies, explain away its
inconsistencies, and decry the fallen principles that have
resulted or could result from the imposition of an
opposition's challenge to a particular conception of "Law.
8 7
In times of crisis (like the Depression), "Law" becomes a
fraught enterprise producing an endless, spiritual discourse
that would uphold "Law"'s timeless principles for the
stability and legitimacy of political and social order.88
Jurisprudence's hyperactive intellectual practice is not
merely significant for the elite legal community; "Law"'s
fantasy also "meets a deep-seated popular demand" for "a
beautiful dream" of transcendent principles of governance.89
To the "man on the street," elite legal academics represent a
"priesthood whose duty it is to expound that science,
unmoved by the irrelevancies of practical day-to-day
governmental action."9 "It is enough for the public to have
faith in institutions of legal learning as guaranties that
principles, forgotten in the wickedness of a political world,
are being constantly refined and made more useful for the
world of tomorrow."' In addition, Arnold argued, legal
academics cultivate "Law"'s illusory perfection because it
confers status on their institutions, distinguishing law
school as an intellectual enterprise from mere vocational
training.92 Merely disavowing participation in the self-
righteous world of "jurisprudence"-a move that was
central to the realist's response to formalism-was
inadequate for the properly Arnoldian diagnostician
86. Id. at 44.
87. See Id. at 17; see also N.E. SIMMONDS, THE DECLINE OF JURIDICAL
REASON: DOCTRINE AND THEORY IN THE LEGAL ORDER 91-93 (1984) (describing
Arnold's conception of jurisprudence as emphasizing its presence rather than its
content in maintaining the appearance of consistency in legal thought).
88. See FOLKLORE, supra note 3, at 8; 62-63; 78-79; 83-117; SYMBOLS, supra
note 3, at 36-37.
89. SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 33 (emphasis added).
90. SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 49.
91. Id. at 52.
92. See id. at 57.
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because of the role jurisprudence plays both inside and
outside the halls of the legal priesthood.
The fantasy of economics is no different from that of
"Law," Arnold asserted. Neoclassical economics' utopian
images of a free, "unimpeded competitive" marketplace, a
rational man "who would work only for profit," and an
essential, biologically determined human selfishness,
"supplements the law as one of our most important symbols
of government." 3 Like "Law," with its assumption of an
abstract "legal man" who requires a complex series of rules
to guide behavior, economics assumes an equally abstract
"economic man," the automaton who follows, and should be
allowed to follow, his self-interest.94 These abstractions
hindered possible legal and political solutions to the
Depression, when the assumptions upon which they are
based no longer hold. If a specific instance of law-breaking
or a private dispute requires a legal solution, Arnold
argued, "it becomes our duty to formulate logical rules and
systems"; but if a specific instance of market failure
requires a regulatory solution, "it becomes our duty to let it
alone" in order to protect the abstract notion of the
"market" from interference." As a result, the dominant
symbols surrounding economics and law stymied practical
governance and intervention into the market. Government
could not participate in the market in the same innovative,
experimental manner as private industry because any such
legal innovations would contradict the established symbolic
presence of government as "bureaucracy" and would be
found unconstitutional under the formalist symbols of
"Law."96 Similarly, government could not interfere with the
economic "laws" of supply and demand, the free market,
and the natural efficiency of private enterprise without
facing the wrath of dominant economic theories.97
Nevertheless, just as he must work with the prevailing
formalist legal theory, so the Arnoldian diagnostician must
utilize the prevailing economic theories:" "His choice of
theories cannot be made on any other ground than that of
expediency in gaining the ends he desires. Legal and
93. Id. at 74.
94. Id. at 78, 84.
95. Id. at 85-86.
96. See id. at 99-100.
97. See id. at 98-99.
98. See id. at 103.
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economic theory, whether radical or conservative, can never
make him a prophet. They may, however, make him a
successful advocate. 99
Arnold noted this necessity in the political and legal
struggles for legitimation and implementation of the New
Deal. He lamented the fact that "government," as a symbol
opposed to "rugged individuals," was one of the most
powerful negative symbols of his day, whereas the private
corporation, as a symbol opposed to government and akin to
the rugged individual in the marketplace, remained a
remarkably durable and powerful symbol of efficiency and
freedom even in the depths of the Depression.' ° As such,
the "polar words," "government" (and similar symbols
invoking a monolithic state), and its opposite the "rugged
individual" (along with other symbols invoking the hero of a
popularized and romantic classical liberalism) organized
governance by establishing the conditions under which any
legal, economic, or political theory or movement could
describe or act upon the world. Within the historical context
of the Depression, polar words served as ingenious, binary
symbols. Opponents of the New Deal could conjure the
shibboleths of "paternalism" or "bureaucracy" or, worse,
"socialism" or "totalitarianism," to describe proposed
government programs, thereby demonizing legislative and
regulatory intervention in the market. 1 For example, in
the early New Deal, "private investment" in industrial
infrastructure by individuals and private corporations
served as a privileged, celebrated term, while "government
expenditure" into public infrastructure, although an
"investment" by a government institution, had strong
negative connotations as an artificial and destructive
intrusion into the natural order.0 2 Under the weight of such
99. Id. at 104.
100. See FOLKLORE, supra note 3, at 107-08.
101. See id. at 167-70; see also SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 127 (listing "the
rule of law vs. bureaucracy, freedom vs. regimentation, [and] individualism vs.
socialism" as central binaries in judicial resistance to the New Deal) (emphasis
omitted).
102. SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 112. See also id. at 116 (describing taxation
as demonized term); id. at 120-22 (describing process by which Social Security
bill of 1935 was successfully passed by redefining the program as "insurance");
id. at 152-53 (describing "law enforcement" as a privileged term for
maintenance of moral order).
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folklore, New Deal proponents could not present their own
symbols in a positive context."3
Nevertheless, these seemingly immutable ideological
barriers to change could be contested. From observing the
struggles of the New Deal to establish itself in the symbolic
realm, Arnold concluded that in the midst of a social crisis,
a specific "social need" left unaddressed by a prevailing
order will go unmet until "new abstractions" emerge to
justify filling this need."' That is, emerging political
movements and ideas will face a lag between their first
appearance and their ultimate success. New or competing
"creeds" or ideological formations, such as the New Deal,
face the "obstacle" of existing, dominant creeds; but when
the emergent creeds begin to dominate and older
institutions fade, the residual symbols remain in circulation
within the newly dominant regime,"5 and may even be used
by believers in the displaced regime or by a newly emergent
opposition.0 6 He argued that the New Deal must adopt, or
at least adapt, the prevailing theories of its time to be
successful.0 7 The symbols of governance thus insure against
radical social and political change by providing an
historically stable medium through which the demands of
outsiders can achieve recognition and approval without
upsetting the structures of power and the distribution of
108
resources.
2. Political Dynamics and the Study of Ideology and
Propaganda. Other academics and intellectuals sought, like
Arnold, to conceptualize "culture" and "ideology" as
substances that were manipulable by propaganda experts
to meet specific or general ends. The sociologist Karl
Mannheim, whose book Ideology and Utopia was translated
into English in 1936, sought to move the study of "how men
actually think" from "how thinking appears in textbooks on
logic" to "how it really functions in public life and in politics
as an instrument of collective action." ' 9 To achieve this,
103. See FOLKLORE, supra note 3, at 2.
104. Id. at 378-79.
105. See id. at 118-19.
106. See id. at 119-20.
107. SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 235.
108. See id. at 35.
109. KARL MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 1 (Louis Wirth & Edward Shils trans., 1936).
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Mannheim promoted the study of "ideology" as a term of
approbation of an opponent's views, as a form of false
consciousness, and in the more totalizing conception of
ideology as "the characteristics and composition of the total
structure of the mind of [an] epoch or of [a] group. 11 °
Mannheim's "ideologies," like Arnold's symbols and folklore,
provided a conceptual framework for analyzing both
political battles and the terms with which these battles
were engaged.
Whether Arnold knew of or read Mannheim is
unclear.111 By contrast, Arnold was clearly aware of the
influential work on propaganda of the political scientist
Harold Lasswell, and the parallels between Arnold's and
Lasswell's work are certain."2 Lasswell applied the
110. Id. at 55-56.
111. According to Duxbury and Schlegel, Arnold had no access to
Mannheim's work, which was not translated into English until 1936. See
Duxbury, supra note 2, at 21 n.64 (describing personal communication with
John Henry Schlegel). As such, Arnold may have read the work while writing
Folklore, which was not published until 1937, especially given Arnold's
connections to scholars in the social sciences. My argument is less pointed than
the notion that Arnold was influenced by Mannheim, however. Others-
including Mannheim and his American translators, who were prominent
sociologists-were raising many of the same issues that interested Arnold
regarding the partiality of human knowledge and perspective. Indeed, one
reviewer of both books in 1939 noted the similarities between Arnold's work and
Mannheim's work on ideologies. See Max Rheinstein, The Role of Reason in
Politics-According to Thurman Arnold, 49 ETHICS 212, 214 (1939).
112. Lasswell and Arnold corresponded; in one letter, Arnold praised
Lasswell's work. See, e.g., GRESSLEY, supra note 13, at 204 (reprinting letter
from Arnold to Harold D. Lasswell, Feb. 22, 1935) (praising Lasswell, The
Moral Vocation of the Middle-Income Skill Group, 45 INT'L J. ETHICS 127
(1935)). Lasswell, in turn, admired Arnold's analysis of political symbols for his
"think[ing] with unconventional freedom about government." See Harold D.
Lasswell, Book Review, 2 PUB. OP. Q. 687, 689 (1938) (reviewing SYMBOLS and
FOLKLORE). Furthermore, their work has long been compared. See, e.g., J.
MICHAEL SPROULE, PROPAGANDA AND DEMOCRACY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF
MEDIA AND MASS PERSUASION 70, 102-06 (1997) (placing Arnold within field of
political scientists like Lasswell and semanticists like S.I. Hayakawa studying
manipulability of language and symbols in the 1930s and early 1940s); MARK C.
SMITH, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN THE CRUCIBLE 215 (1994) (noting that Lasswell, like
Arnold, "consciously used myths and untruths to manipulate the public in the
service of an allegedly moral organization"); WARREN I. SUSMAN, CULTURE AS
HISTORY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN SOCIETY IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 161 (1984) (associating Arnold and Lasswell as similar contemporary
analysts of "political life" during the 1930s); Lowell Dittmer, Political Culture
and Political Symbolism: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis, 29 WORLD POL. 552,
559-60 (1977) (describing Arnold's work as "continu[ing] the Lasswellian
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prevailing psychological and psychoanalytic theories of the
time to conclude that the public could-and indeed must-
be persuaded and controlled through the use of cultural
symbols."' Thus for Lasswell, propaganda, "the
management of collective attitudes by the manipulation of
significant symbols," enables benign social control by
presenting an issue "in such a manner that certain cultural
attitudes will be organized toward it.""' Arnold approved of
Lasswell's focus on propaganda as a critical force in politics,
and embraced Lasswell's methodological combination of
quantitative studies of the effects of propaganda and
textual interpretation of literature and newspapers. 5 Like
the public intellectual and newspaper columnist Walter
Lippmann, whose earlier, enormously influential book
Public Opinion (1922) similarly argued that the public
relied on largely irrational mental images and stereotyped
symbols to form their opinions,"' Lasswell attracted and
tradition"). Long after Arnold had left Yale, Lasswell joined with Arnold's
student Myres McDougal in establishing the first formal post-realist
interdisciplinary school of legal theory and education, "policy science," which
sought to combine legal and social scientific study to meet clearly articulated
liberal ends. See DUXBURY, supra note 15, at 171-81; KALMAN, supra note 2, at
178-86.
113. See Harold D. Lasswell, The Function of the Propagandist, 38 INT'L J.
ETHICS 258 (1928); Harold D. Lasswell, The Theory of Political Propaganda, 21
AM. POL. ScI. REV. 627 (1927) [hereinafter Lasswell, Political Propaganda]. The
best summaries of Lasswell's work on propaganda are BRETT GARY, THE
NERVOUS LIBERALS: PROPAGANDA ANXIETIES FROM WORLD WAR I TO THE COLD
WAR 55-84 (1999); MARK C. SMITH, supra note 112, at 212-52 (1994); SPROULE,
supra note 112, at 67-71.
114. Lasswell, Political Propaganda, supra note 113, at 627, 629; see also
HAROLD D. LASSWELL, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND POLITICS 183-93 (1930)
(describing "irrationality" in political movements, specifically in the
"displacement" of private affects upon public objects such as political symbols).
115. In a 1935 letter to Lasswell, responding to a number of article reprints
the political scientist had sent him, Arnold praised one article which argued
that the American middle class-subject to constant propaganda organized by,
and in the interest of, the "plutocracy"-was likely to become increasingly self-
conscious about its economic and political vulnerability to the elites above them
and the lower classes below them. See GRESSLEY, supra note 13, at 204
(reprinting letter from Arnold to Harold D. Lasswell, Feb. 22, 1935) (praising
Lasswell, The Moral Vocation of the Middle-Income Skill Group, 45 INT'L J.
ETHICS 127, 133-34, 137 (1935)). Although much of Lasswell's work relied upon
quantitative methodologies, see SPROULE, supra note 112, at 71, in fact a
significant amount of his propaganda analysis and theory did not rely upon
quantitative study.
116. WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION 365 (1922). To deal with the
complexities of the modern "world beyond our reach," Lippmann argued,
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influenced Arnold as a social critic who recognized
propaganda's powerful role in mass society.
Lippmann was not the only important precursor to
Arnold's and Lasswell's interest in symbolic governance. In
Symbols, Arnold explicitly praised the Italian sociologist
and economist Vilfredo Pareto. Pareto's sociological
writings had become fashionable among intellectuals and
academics at Harvard and Yale during the early 1930s,"'
when English translations and commentaries on Pareto's
sociology first widely appeared in print."8 Better known in
legal academia today for his earlier career as an economist,
Pareto the sociologist sought to supplement classical
economic assumptions of individual behavior as the rational
satisfaction of wants by stressing the non-logical,
passionate aspects of beliefs and actions."9  Pareto's
sociological theory also posited elite leadership as a
structural and necessary feature of political and social
effective leaders must be protected from the vicissitudes of the public while
employing the techniques of psychological research and the technology of mass
communications to achieve "the manufacture of consent" through persuasion
and propaganda. Id. at 238-39. On the relationship between Lippmann's and
Arnold's work, see Louis Hartz, The Coming of Age of America, 51 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 474, 479 (1957); on the relationship between Lippmann's and Lasswell's
work, see PURCELL, supra note 37, at 107. Good summaries of Public Opinion
and its place within Lippmann's long and prominent career include D. STEVEN
BLUM, WALTER LIPPMANN: COSMOPOLITANISM IN THE CENTURY OF TOTAL WAR 60-
69, 80-84 (1984); LARRY L. ADAMS, WALTER LIPPMANN 94-122 (1977).
117. See Arthur Livingston, Editor's Note, in 1 VILFREDO PARETO, THE MIND
AND SOCIETY at v, v-vi (Andrew Bongiorno & Arthur Livingston, trans.,
Livingston ed., 1935); Barbara S. Heyl, The Harvard "Pareto Circle," 4 J. HIST.
BEHAV. SCI. 316 (1968); Joseph Lopreato & Sandra Rusher, Vilfredo Pareto's
Influence on U.S.A. Sociology, 65 REVUE EUROPO9ENE DES SCIENCES SOCIALES
69, at 71-73 (1983); Bernard DeVoto, Sentiment and the Social Order, 167
HARPER'S MONTHLY MAGAZINE 569 (1933). More recent discussions of Pareto's
sociology include Patrik Aspers, Crossing the Boundary of Economics and
Sociology: The Case of Vilfredo Pareto, 60 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 519 (2001);
Joseph Femia, Pareto's Concept of Demagogic Plutocracy, 30 GOV'T &
OPPOSITION 370 (1995); and N. S. Timasheff, Law in Pareto's Sociology, 46 AM.
J. SOC. 139 (1940).
118. In 1934, Knopf published An Introduction to Pareto, a popularizing
summary of Pareto's sociology by two leaders of the Harvard Pareto seminar.
GEORGE C. HOMANS & CHARLES P. CURTIS, JR., Preface to AN INTRODUCTION TO
PARETO: HIS SOCIOLOGY (1934). A year later, Pareto's Trattato di Sociologia
generale appeared in four volumes as The Mind and Society. See PARETO, supra
note 117.




systems.12 ° Arnold reveled in what he saw as Pareto's role as
a "prophet[] of the hard-boiled use of power" who made "the
humanitarian ideals, which [popular] slogans called up in
the minds of masses of people, . . . disappear. 1 21 "With
pitiless logic," Arnold proclaimed, Pareto had discovered
"that there is no reality behind political and economic
theories.' 22 This exuberance, as well as the prominence of
both the symbolic realm of governance and the role of elites
in Arnold's work, suggests that Pareto's work served as an
important influence on Arnold's approach. Consideration of
Pareto's sociology helps fill in some of the theoretical gaps
in Arnold's work.
123
Pareto based his theory of human behavior on the
distinction he saw between "logical actions," which
"logically conjoin means to ends" from an objective,
scientific standpoint, '24 and "non-logical" actions, which
seem logical to the persons performing them but are "mere
manifestations of instincts.021  "Human beings," Pareto
wrote, "have a very conspicuous tendency to paint a varnish
of logic over their conduct, 12 and he considered his work an
effort to study and strip away the "disfigure[ment]" of
reality at work in rationalizing theories that make non-
logical conduct appear logical to human actors. 7 Pareto's
120. See id. at 239-40.
121. SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 250.
122. Id.
123. Arnold's recognition of a kindred spirit in Pareto is clear in a letter he
wrote to The New Republic, which solicited from him while he was still at Yale
a contribution to a series called "Books That Changed Our Minds." In response
to the letter, Arnold wrote that "Pareto seemed to me an elaboration of the
obvious, so I dropped it after a very cursory examination." BOOKS THAT
CHANGED OUR MINDS, supra note 1, at 8. My elaboration of Pareto's work, then,
is to elucidate what for Arnold was "the obvious," in order better to understand
Arnold's work. The connection between the two was certainly obvious to some
careful readers. One contemporary reviewer of Symbols found Pareto's influence
on Arnold to be so profound as to approach plagiarism. See Peter H. Odegard,
Symbols of Government By Thomas Arnold, 21 CORNELL L. Q. 686 (1936) (book
review). A more recent commentator has noted the similarities between Pareto's
sociology and Harold Lasswell's work during this period. See John E. Tashjean,
Politics: Lasswell and Pareto, CAHIERS VILFREDO PARETO No. 22-23, at 267
(1970).
124. 1 PARETO, supra note 117, § 150, at 77.
125. 4 PARETO, supra note 117, app. at 1915.
126. 1 PARETO, supra note 117, § 154, at 79.
127. Id. §§ 249, 253, at 171, 172-73. For Pareto, the manifestations of
sentiments in non-logical actions are "residues"; while the rationalizations
constructed to legitimize a particular line of conduct, making more acceptable
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theory of non-logical actions was not psychological, because
he had no interest in the causes or internal workings of
"psychic states., 128 Nor was it historical or materialist,
because unlike Marxist theories of ideology that situate
false consciousness within a specific historical context,
Pareto asserted that derivations and non-logical actions
originate from "innate tendencies of an unchanging human
nature" rather than an historically situated "false
consciousness.."129 For Pareto, non-logical behavior and post
hoc rationalizations were simply essential attributes of
human action.
They were also central to Pareto's theory of elites and
political and social order. Like Machiavelli, Pareto stressed
that to obtain and hold political power, elites must
successfully persuade their subjects by utilizing the
symbols of moral and political doctrines, rather than
objective, scientific truth.3 ° And it was imperative that
elites do so; for Pareto, "the art of government lies in
finding ways to take advantage of... sentiments, not in
wasting one's energies in futile efforts to destroy them, the
sole effect of which, frequently, is simply to strengthen
them."'' Elites must engage in a beneficial form of
manipulation by clothing the real interests of the masses in
fictional forms to appeal to the masses' base sentiments.'32
Pareto's ultimate normative end was a stable, wealth-
maximizing political order run by competent elites who
maintain their authority through persuasive techniques
narrow and destructive interests, are "derivations." S.E. Finer, Introduction to
VILFREDO PARETO: SOCIOLOGICAL WRITINGS 3, 14 (S.E. Finder ed. & Derick
Mirfin trans., 1966). The relationship between residues and sentiments in
Pareto's work is unclear, and at times nonexistent; at minimum, sentiments are
the religious, moral, legal, and customary norms that result from the
combination of human nature, individual circumstances, and historical context.
See 2 RONALD FLETCHER, THE MAKING OF SOCIOLOGY: A STUDY OF SOCIOLOGICAL
THEORY 596-97 (1971).
128. 1 PARETO, supra note 117, § 161, at 87-88.
129. INO Rossi, FROM THE SOCIOLOGY OF SYMBOLS TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF
SIGNS: TOWARD A DIALECTICAL SOCIOLOGY 92 (1983). On the relationship
between Pareto and Marxist theories of ideology, see NORBERTO BOBBIO,
IDEOLOGICAL PROFILE OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY ITALY 38 (Lydia G. Cochrane
trans., 1995); Finer, supra note 127, at 77-78.
130. See JOSEPH V. FEMIA, THE MACHIAVELLIAN LEGACY: ESSAYS IN ITALIAN
POLITICAL THOUGHT 51 (1998); LEVINE, supra note 119, at 241; TALCOTT
PARSONS, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION 178-79 (1937).
131. 3 PARETO, supra note 117, § 1843, at 1281.
132. See 4 PARETO, supra note 117, § 2250, at 1572.
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and, ultimately, the real threat of force.13 His utilitarianism
posited a clear distinction between the "experiential 'truth'
of certain theories" and their "social 'utility"'-these being
"two things [that] are not only one and the same but may,
and often do, stand in flat contradiction.134 Rulers' identities
and approaches may change continually, with occasional
"sudden and violent disturbances" leading to leadership
changes among political and economic elites.135 What
mattered more than the precise composition, or even
approach, of a particular ruling elite was less significant
than that elite's ability to maximize wealth and hold power.
At bottom, Pareto had little interest in offering therapeutic
approaches to purge the non-logical from political and
public life; instead, he attempted to remove considerations
of the moral and normative from his political analysis.136 In
the words of one of his American mid-1930s admirers,
Pareto "write[s] what men do and not what they ought to
do. "137 The statement encapsulates Arnold's own "hard-
boiled" approach: an emergent political order, specifically
the New Deal, should put aside both the formalists'
impossible desire and the realists' debunking and reformist
efforts in favor of articulating reform in the form of popular
symbols and desire.
3. Political Dynamics, Anthropology, and the Study of
Symbols. Arnold also conceived of this symbolic struggle in
anthropological terms.138  Although he cited no
anthropologists in either of his mid-1930s monographs, the
words folklore and symbols in his titles clearly evoke the
anthropological approach. In addition, he ironically and
with great delight applied anthropological concepts of
"primitive" cultures to the thoroughly modern institutions
133. See RICHARD BELLAMY, MODERN ITALIAN SOCIAL THEORY: IDEOLOGY AND
POLITICS FROM PARETO TO THE PRESENT 30 (1987); LEVINE, supra note 119, at
240-41.
134. 2 PARETO, supra note 117, § 843, at 500.
135. 3 PARETO, supra note 117, § 2056, at 1431; see also Finer, supra note
127, at 55-62 (summarizing Pareto's conceptualization of governing classes,
economic forces, and their relationship).
136. See 4 PARETO, supra note 117, §§ 2239, 2394, at 1567, 1726-27.
137. See LAWRENCE J. HENDERSON, PARETO'S GENERAL SOCIOLOGY: A
PHYSIOLOGIST'S INTERPRETATION 57 (1937).
138. On the relevance of Arnold's work for anthropologists, see Laura
Nader's important article The Anthropological Study of Law, 67 AM.
ANTHROPOLOGIST 3, 19 (1965).
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of "government" and "capitalism." In Symbols, for example,
he compared primitive societies' rational laws based on
irrational premises to modern societies' irrational laws
based on seemingly rational bases,'139 and he associated the
modern ritual of the criminal trial with the taboos and
magic of "primitive societies."'4 At the same time, in private
correspondence, he compared his perspective in Folklore to
that of an anthropologist studying Filipino "customs and
taboos."''
Arnold thus utilized the idea of anthropology to
illuminate some universal generalities of human culture,
and appropriated the anthropological notion of culture as
an integrated whole that was widely shared during the
1920s and 1930s. 42 He shared the central assumptions of
the Americanist anthropological tradition, established in
the early twentieth century. These included the notions
that culture is not merely behavior but the set of symbols
people use to explain their behaviors; that culture is a
constructed, symbolic world of habits and customs that
structure human thought and action; and that language,
thought, and reality combine in ways that can be studied,
understood, and analyzed by social scientists. 4 '
Arnold's choice of the term "folklore" is especially
telling. For Franz Boas, the most significant American
anthropologist of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
139. See SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 4.
140. Id. at 131. Arnold, like his fellow realists, was apparently not drawn to,
or perhaps was unaware of, the historical and sociological scholarship of Henry
Maine or Max Weber which also sought to understand the present in its
relationship to the past. See SCHLEGEL, supra note 25, at 235.
141. GRESSLEY, supra note 13, at 231 (reprinting letter from Arnold to
Epaphroditus Peck, attorney, Bristol, Conn., July 13, 1936).
142. See John S. Gilkeson, Jr., The Domestication of "Culture" in Interwar
America 1919-1941, in THE ESTATE OF SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE 153 (JoAnne Brown
& David K. van Keuren eds., 1991). The fact that Arnold used anthropology to
demonstrate the foibles of modernity is consistent not only with how the
anthropologists of the 1930s occasionally wielded their work, but also with
Veblen's stance towards the "leisure class" and modernity generally. See id. at
161, 168; see also Anne Mayhew, Veblen and the Anthropological Perspective, in
THE FOUNDING OF INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 234, 241-42 (Warren J. Samuels
ed., 1998) (describing the influence of anthropology on Veblen and institutional
economics).
143. See REGNA DARNELL, INVISIBLE GENEALOGIES: A HISTORY OF
AMERICANIST ANTHROPOLOGY 12-14 (2001); PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM:




centuries, "folklore" was "the total mass of traditional
matter present in the mind of a given people at any given
time,"144 and "the science of all of the manifestations of
popular life." '145 Folkloric beliefs and practices that had
begun in the unconscious became central to a specific
culture because they rationalized, and therefore
maintained, traditional forms of behavior, and because they
remained relevant to more advanced cultures through
modern reinterpretation and use.'46 If folklore was the study
of everything, everywhere, no matter how banal and
"popular," and if, for Arnold, capitalism and government
were defined by their symbols, then the study of governance
could not be limited to the study of rational actor models or
the legal forms that emerge from appellate opinions or
legislation-or, for that matter, the debunking of such
models and forms. The study of governance must consider
everything from the propaganda of mass culture (in, for
example, The Saturday Evening Post and the movies) to the
inner workings and self-important discourse of the
academy, the courts, and the legislature (in, for example,
judicial decisions and the public pronouncements of
professors and intellectuals).47
Notwithstanding the centrality of Boasian anthropology
in the American academy in the mid-1930s, Arnold and
other realists seemed especially drawn to the more
functionalist social anthropology associated at the time
with Bronislaw Malinowski, whose monograph Crime and
Custom in Savage Society had been published in 1926.148
The attraction is not surprising, given the realists' own
commitment to functionalism. Functionalist social
144. Frank Boas, The Mind of Primitive Man, 14 J. AM. FOLKLORE 1, 2-3
(1901).
145. Franz Boas, The History of Anthropology, 20 Sci. 512, 519 (1904).
146. See GEORGE W. STOCKING, JR., Franz Boas and the Culture Concept in
Historical Perspective, in RACE, CULTURE, AND EVOLUTION: ESSAYS IN THE
HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY 195, 225-27 (1968). Indeed, anthropologist Edward
Sapir, whose tenure at Yale overlapped with Arnold's, applied conceptions of
culture and personality from the anthropology of simpler cultures to those of
modern industrial society. See DARNELL, supra note 143, at 127.
147. See supra text accompanying note 1.
148. See Francis G. Snyder, Anthropology, Dispute Processes and Law: A
Critical Introduction, 8 BRIT. J. L. & SOC. 141, 142-43 (1981) (noting
Malinowski's emphasis on function over form in Crime and Custom in Savage
Society).
149. See supra Part I.A.
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anthropology assumed a culture to be a dynamic, organic
whole whose parts, including its laws, relate to each other
by meeting social interests and needs.15 ° To study natives,
one considered their symbolic forms and practices as
supporting the culture and society of which they were an
integral part. The functionalists' insight served practical
goals for early twentieth century colonial states as an
important tool of colonial administration. They enabled
colonial powers to understand better, and administer more
efficiently and peaceably, "the peculiarities of the particular
territory... [and] the principles of social organization
which obtain in other primitive communities."1  Arnold's
conception of law as one aspect of the larger symbols of
governance thus shared with the prevailing anthropology
that drifted into the legal academy he inhabited the notion
that law was a necessary and functional part of a larger
cultural symbolic system. Those who hoped to impose social
order must understand and follow the specific doctrines and
rituals of the population they wished to persuade or
152
conquer.
4. Conclusion. The New Deal represented for Arnold the
paradigmatic example of an emergent constellation of
symbols.153 Indeed, the New Deal's most popular symbol was
President Roosevelt himself, who "expresses for a majority
of the public the current distrust of old myths and the belief
that the Government has a new role to play in providing for
security of individuals in their jobs and in the distribution
of goods. The New Deal was an elite, managed political
movement that successfully deployed symbols for a
functional end to replace what Arnold saw as the outmoded
ideals of an older creed with a modern and capitalist
economic, political, and legal order. Its ultimate success on
the spiritual plane of symbols as well as on the temporal
plane of objective results came not simply from a rational
150. See Huntington Cairns, Law and Anthropology, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 32,
35 (1931).
151. Id. at 53.
152. Arnold's willingness to consider law within a larger socio-cultural
context distinguishes him from Llewellyn's anthropological monograph, co-
authored with Hoebel and published several years after Symbols and Folklore,
which isolated law from other social control systems. See Nader, supra note 138,
at 18 (discussing KARL N. LLEWELLYN & E.A. HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY:
CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE (1941)).
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debunking of its opposition, but also, and equally
importantly, from its credible adaptation and manipulation
of prevailing symbols. The tools Arnold adopted to
understand how these symbols worked, and how these
symbols could be manipulated, were readily available in the
sociological, psychological, and anthropological study of the
culture and control of modern and primitive societies.
B. The Symbols of Institutions: The Dynamics of Collective
Symbolic Action
If symbols constituted for Arnold the cultural tools and
meanings of governance, then the organization or
institution,' rather than the individual, was the central
agent and locus of meaning, production and social change.5"
The shift from what Arnold called the "individualistic era"
of pre- and early-Industrial America to the
"interdependence" of modernity required that the
diagnostician focus on the institution as producer of the
individual, and therefore, on the individual subject as a
mere reflection of the institution or institutions to which
she belongs.'57  He urged that, "we must consider
institutions and the mass psychology surrounding them as
living organisms, not dissimilar to human personalities,...
never quite understanding themselves or the part they are
actually playing because of the necessary illusions with
which they must surround themselves to preserve their
prestige and self-respect."'5 8 The study of group behavior
153. See FOLKLORE, supra note 3, at 390.
154. See id. at 390-91.
155. Arnold failed to provide a clear distinction between, or definitions of,
"institution" and "organization," and instead seemed to confuse them. At times,
he used "organizations" to refer to formally organized, voluntary groups and
"institutions" to refer to their internal habits and customs. See id. at 24-26. At
other times, however, he used the terms interchangeably. See, e.g., id. at 351,
355 (using both "organization" and "institution" to refer to formal groups);
SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at iv (using "institution" to refer to formal organizations
and entities like "courts, commercial banks, or governmental bureaus").
Because the field of institutional economics, with which Arnold was quite
familiar, used the term "institution" to refer to both interchangeably, I will
simply use the term "institution." See infra notes 162-181 and accompanying
text.
156. See FOLKLORE, supra note 3, at 10, 23, 25-26, 350-88.
157. See id. at 349.
158. SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 25-26.
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therefore must focus upon the "habits, disciplines, and
morale" that unify institutions, and the symbolic
"personality or character" institutions develop. 5 9
He presented in Folklore an entire hierarchy of the
salient institutions of mid-1930s America, from the largest
national institutions, such as the nation-state and the
federal government, to smaller and less powerful national
institutions like the Rotary Club and national associations
of academics. Even the smallest institutions, Arnold
argued, resembled the largest in structures and habits.6 '
He proposed studying the symptoms of the social
pathologies produced in the economic and political crisis of
the Depression, pathologies that marked what he saw as
the death throes of an old era. Research would focus on the
internal dynamics of institutions, as well as on the struggle
between emergent and residual institutions for symbolic
control.16
Arnold borrowed his conception of institutions and their
place in symbols and governance from the field of
institutional economics,' which thrived in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the influential
work of such diverse figures as Thorstein Veblen,'63 John R.
159. FOLKLORE, supra note 3, at 350.
160. Id. at 24.
161. Id. at 364.
162. On institutionalism generally, see HEATH PEARSON, ORIGINS OF LAW
AND ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMISTS' NEW SCIENCE OF LAW, 1830-1930, 154-57
(1997); DOROTHY ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE 207 (1991);
Paul T. Homan, The Institutional School [of Economics] 5 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 387 (Edwin R. A. Seligman ed., 1932). On the intellectual
and academic relationship between institutionalism and legal realism, see
DUXBURY, supra note 15, at 98-106; FRIED, supra note 42, 10-15; SCHLEGEL,
supra note 25, at 63; Herbert Hovenkamp, The First Great Law & Economics
Movement, 42 STAN. L. REV. 993, 1013-31 (1990); Herbert Hovenkamp,
Knowledge About Welfare: Legal Realism and the Separation of Law and
Economics, 84 MINN. L. REV. 805, 850-60 (2000).
163. Veblen's major works include: THE PLACE OF SCIENCE IN MODERN
CIVILISATION AND OTHER ESSAYS (1919) [hereinafter VEBLEN, THE PLACE OF
SCIENCE]; THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS: AN ECONOMIC STUDY OF
INSTITUTIONS (Modern Library 1934) (1898) [hereinafter VEBLEN, THEORY OF
THE LEISURE CLASS]; THE VESTED INTERESTS AND THE COMMON MAN (Viking
Press 1964) (1919) [hereinafter VEBLEN, THE VESTED INTERESTS]; and Thorstein
Veblen, Why Is Economics Not an Evolutionary Science? 12 Q. J. ECON. 373
(1898). The secondary literature on Veblen is immense; some commentaries and
summaries are cited in the notes infra. For a well-respected intellectual and
personal biography, see JOSEPH DORFMAN, THORSTEIN VEBLEN AND HIS AMERICA
(1934).
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Commons,"' and Walton Hamilton,.. the latter of whom
was Arnold's colleague at Yale.16 Institutionalists defined
"institution" broadly not only to include the formal
organization but as "a way of thought or action of some
prevalence and permanence, which is embedded in the
habits of a group or the customs of a people ... [and which]
fix[es] the confines of and impose[s] form upon the activities
of human beings."'6 7 Within this amorphous conception,
widely recognized organizational arrangements-from
types of financial transactions to the models of educational
institutions, and from democracy to religious beliefs-are
"institutions.'
68
In institutional economics, Arnold found a model for his
interdisciplinary project of studying the institutional
164. Commons's major works include: INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: ITS PLACE
IN POLITICAL ECONOMY (1934); LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM (1924); and A
SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW OF SOVEREIGNTY (Augustus M. Kelley 1965). For a general
introduction to Commons, see Joseph Dorfman, John R. Commons' General
Theory of Institutions, Introduction to COMMONS, A SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW OF
SOVEREIGNTY (Augustus M. Kelley 1965). A recent collection compares the
major early works of Veblen and Commons and their role in establishing
institutional economics. See THE FOUNDING OF INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: THE
LEISURE CLASS AND SOVEREIGNTY (Warren J. Samuels ed., 1998).
165. Hamilton's major works include: HAMILTON, INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND
INSTITUTIONALISM: SELECTED ESSAYS (Joseph Dorfman ed., 1974); Hamilton,
Institution, in 8 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 84 (Edwin R. A.
Seligman ed., 1932); WALTON HALE HAMILTON & HELEN R. WRIGHT, A WAY OF
ORDER FOR BITUMINOUS COAL (1928). For a general introduction to Hamilton's
work, see Laurence Shute, Walton Hale Hamilton, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO
INSTITUTIONAL AND EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS 310-14 (Geoffrey M. Hodgson et
al. eds., 1994); Joseph Dorfman, Walton Hale Hamilton and Industrial Policy,
in INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND INSTITUTIONALISM, supra.
166. Arnold was close to Hamilton at Yale and throughout his professional
life. See Thurman Arnold, Walton Hale Hamilton, 68 YALE L. J. 399, 399 (1959).
167. Hamilton, supra note 165, at 84; see also John R. Commons,
Institutional Economics, 21 AM. ECON. REV. 648, 650 (1931) (defining institution
as "collective action in control, liberation, and expansion of individual action").
Veblen's definition was similarly inclusive. See, e.g., VEBLEN, THE PLACE OF
SCIENCE, supra note 163, at 239 (defining institutions as "settled habits of
thought common to the generality of men"); VEBLEN, THEORY OF THE LEISURE
CLASS, supra note 163, at 119 (defining institutions as "prevalent habits of
thought with respect to particular relations and particular functions of the
individual and of the community"); see generally STANLEY MATTHEW DAUGERT,
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THORSTEIN VEBLEN 49 (1950) (explaining that Veblen's
notion of institution described more widely prevalent habits of thought,
including principles, customs, laws, and ideologies, as well as the products or
results of these principles, customs, laws, and ideologies).
168. Hamilton, supra note 165, at 84.
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structure and context within which the symbols of
governance have meaning.169 For institutional economists,
the aggregate of the distinct human institutions of a given
place and time constitute a society's culture, and the
interplay between collective institutions and the actions of
individuals actions is at the core of "the drama of the social
process.""17 Thus, historical, cultural, and symbolic contexts,
as well as the prevailing contemporary common sense and
"the practical commitments of the moment," affect
institutional behavior.171
Arnold's break from traditional legal study paralleled
institutionalism's break from traditional economics.
Institutionalism rejected the narrow study of individual
economic behavior and the concept of the self-regulating
market. Veblen despised the latter for its abstract models
that "t[ook] for granted, denied, or explained away" the
collective and social institutions of modern capitalism;..2 he
championed instead a more broadly conceived project that
considered economics within a wider conception of
culture.173 Institutional economists explicitly considered
individuals as social beings located within specific historical
contexts, rather than as isolated rational actors.'74
169. In 1938, Arnold identified Veblen's "analysis of American business" as
a key influence on his work. See BOOKS THAT CHANGED OUR MINDS, supra note
1, at 8; see also DAVID RIESMAN, THORSTEIN VEBLEN: A CRITICAL INTERPRETATION
iii, 94 (1960) (noting that Arnold knew of Veblen's work while he was at Yale).
In addition, there was a well-established social and intellectual relationship
between institutional economists and legal realists, see FOLKLORE, supra note 3,
at 161, and Veblen was well-known to New Deal intellectuals. See Max Lerner,
Editor's Introduction, THE PORTABLE VEBLEN 31-32 (Max Lerner ed., 1948).
Arnold's work did not, however, make clear the influences on his thinking;
neither Symbols nor Folklore, nor his earlier work, provided ample notation of
his sources, although he did cite Hamilton in Symbols, and Dorfman's
biography of Veblen in Folklore. See FOLKLORE, supra note 3, at 186-87, 218-20
(quoting DORFMAN, supra note 163); SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 74-75 (quoting
WALTON HAMILTON, THE CASE OF BITUMINOUS COAL (1925)).
170. Hamilton, supra note 165, at 84.
171. Id. at 84-85.
172. VEBLEN, THE PLACE OF SCIENCE, supra note 163, at 233.
173. See Homan, supra note 162, at 388 (describing the complex range of
economic determinants, including "human nature, changes in technology and
the general development of knowledge and ideas").
174. See Edythe S. Miller, Veblen and Commons and the Concept of
Community, in THE FOUNDING OF INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS, supra note 164, at
14, 18 (explaining that both Veblen and Commons saw individuals' behavior as
influenced by working rules of institutions, "as driven by custom, convention,
habits of 'use and wont,' legal standards, the common sense of the community-
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Arnold was also undoubtedly attracted to institutional-
ists' tendency to critique the current status quo and to call
for, as well as occasionally participate in, economic reform.
Institutions, institutionalists agreed, adapt over time and
their precise development could be affected by intervention
necessary to change an unsatisfactory status quo."' For
Veblen, men's habits of thoughts evolve through
evolutionary change in individual and collective economic
activity,'76 a process he sought to understand through
evolutionary economics, "the theory of a process of cultural
growth as determined by the economic interest, a theory of
a cumulative sequence of economic institutions stated in
terms of the process itself."'77
Accordingly, institutionalists were generally progres-
sive reformers whose work on labor, money and business
cycles, and the nature of corporate management and
capitalism influenced the New Deal.'78 As one leading
historian of early twentieth century social sciences has
argued, institutionalism helped to pave the way for
Keynes's governmentalist solution, while Keynesian
economics was a "proof-by the extension of neoclassical
technique itself-of the institutionalists' claim that the
market was not an optimum self-equilibrating process and
that the intervention of government was necessary to
achieve democratic social goals."'79  Like Arnold,
institutionalists did not call for a radical restructuring of
the market; rather, they hoped to retain those parts of the
market where competition functioned properly, and to
utilize state action only where it could increase competition,
all social-in addition to anticipations of pleasure and pain"); Ross, supra note
162, at 210; see, e.g, COMMONS, INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS supra note 164, at 44-
45 (insisting on "social habit" as "the most elementary fact of living creatures");
VEBLEN, THE PLACE OF SCIENCE, supra note 163, at 324-25 (insisting on
communities, rather than on self-sufficient individuals, as the focus of life
history); Clarence E. Ayers, The Co-ordinates of Institutionalism, 41 AM. ECON.
REV. 47, 49 (1951) (dismissing classical economics' conception of atomistic
human behavior because "[hiuman beings are social phenomena").
175. See FRIED, supra note 42, at 11.
176. VEBLEN, THE PLACE OF SCIENCE, supra note 163, at 74-75.
177. Veblen, supra note 163, at 393.
178. See FRIED, supra note 42, at 11.
179. ROSS, supra note 162, at 419. Contra DUXBURY, supra note 15, at 101
(arguing that institutional economics was "preoccup[ied] with critique at the
expense of pragmatic proposals for economic reform").
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regulate monopoly, and protect the rights of labor.18 ° Their
goal was a utilitarian mix of equity and increased
productivity; in Veblen's words, "[t]he common good, so far
as it is a question of material welfare, is evidently best
served by an unhampered working of the industrial system
at its full capacity, without interruption or dislocation."'1 81
Although Arnold referred more explicitly to formal
organizations when he used the term "institution" than
institutionalists did, he shared institutionalists' emphasis
on collective social activity and beliefs, and especially on the
evolutionary development of institutions.'82 He called for
studying institutions within their historical and symbolic
context from their initial organization, through their
growth, and into their reification and personification in a
legally cognizable organizational form with ownership of
capital assets. 83 As their membership, influence, and
material and legal existence expand, Arnold observed,
institutions develop contradictory roles that arise from
their increasing complexity and interaction with other
institutions.'84 Thus, for example, the responsible private
business corporation acts simultaneously as a profit-driven
enterprise, a representative of moral, ethical, and legal
principles, a caring employer of its executives and
managers and stern employer of its low waged workers, and
a philanthropic and concerned public citizen."' Accordingly,
Arnold proposed that a focus of Political Dynamics should
be upon the symptoms produced by the conflicted,
180. See Ross, supra note 162, at 412-13; Dorothy Ross, Socialism and
American Liberalism: Academic Social Thought in the 1930s, in 11
PERSPECTIVES IN AM. HIST. 5, 78-79 (1977-78); see also THEODOR ADORNO,
Veblen's Attack on Culture, in PRISMS 75, 91 (Samuel & Shierry Weber trans.,
1981) (criticizing Veblen's inability to provide more than "a barbaric
denunciation" of "barbarian culture"); RIESMAN, supra note 169, at x-xi (1960)
(noting relationship between Veblen's work and the populist movements of the
late-18th and early-19th centuries, particularly in his criticism of conspicuous
consumption and the "pecuniary" and "vested interests"); Max Lerner, Editor's
Introduction, in THE PORTABLE VEBLEN 36 (1949) (claiming Veblen was no
revolutionary and that his work was an "assault... on the mythology of
business civilization, rather than on the theme of exploitation").
181. VEBLEN, THE VESTED INTERESTS, supra note 163, at 90-93.
182. See FOLKLORE, supra note 3, at 23-40, 349-93.
183. See id. at 350-53.
184. Id. at 355.
185. Id. at 34, 355, 360-62.
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contradictory dynamic of the modern evolutionary
institution.1 6
Arnold's study of symbols was therefore a study of the
symbol within institutions, and, more broadly, of the
relationships among symbols, institutions, and governance.
Symbolism and language, Arnold observed, are at the core
of institutions, affecting and "crystallizing" group and
individual attitudes and serving as the "cement which binds
the organization together." '187 Institutions and their symbols
also provoke legal, governmental, and economic change.
Emerging institutions develop their own language in order
to express themselves, thereby infusing the wider existing
folklore with new possibilities. They compete with existing
institutions by representing a "new class" able to develop "a
creed of its own and a set of heroes."'88 Thus as new
institutions emerge, the meanings of "Law'"s "great
reservoir of emotionally important social symbols" begins to
change.'89 Even in Symbols, when he was more pessimistic
about the possibility of political change, Arnold noted that
such change could happen "in spite of, and not because of
the grammarians" of jurisprudence.'
C. Conclusion
For Arnold, "Law" was an historical construction
subject to institutional struggle over its dominant meanings
at any particular moment. It did not exist, and therefore
could not be studied, in isolation. Nor could it be debunked;
nor could it be reformed out of existence. His commitment
to interdisciplinary study and to the reconceptualization of
law within broader fields of governance was distinct among
legal academics of the time and was tied to his political and
institutional commitments. As Part III discusses, so was his
polemical, ironic style, which enabled his work both to
reach a broader audience and to retain a force that remains
for contemporary readers.
186. Id. at 349.
187. Id. at 148.
188. FOLKLORE, supra note 3, at 39, 148.




III. THE IRONY OF SYMBOLS: ARNOLD'S CRITICAL VOICE
Arnold possessed extraordinary abilities as an ironist.
He could identify, describe, destroy, and then reconstruct as
necessary the foibles of modernity. Consider a few
examples. He described the hypocrisy of the Prohibition, in
which politicians drank in private but proclaimed the
importance of law enforcement in public, not merely as
emblematic of a "religious" ideal of legal order that covers a
"wide conflict between practice and utterance" but as
essential to the operation of judicial institutions that rely
on the mechanical operation of the rule of law."' The
disparity between ideal and practice, through which law
enforcement appears to have merely emotional value akin
to "Santa Claus or football in college," helps explain the fact
that "the ceremonies which attend [law enforcement's]
observance... become very elaborate indeed."'92 Arnold also
embraced the municipal political machine over its
Progressive opponents. He did so not to embrace corruption,
but to praise the machine's functionalism over the
Progressives' fetishization of clean, apolitical government.
"[R]espectable people could not think politically,"'93 Arnold
chided, and they longed to "remov[e] politics from
politics";' machines, by contrast, could "do the practical
tasks of government.'
95
His identification of Prohibition as a symptomatic
symbol of the hidden but necessary hypocrisy of law
enforcement and his embrace of the local political machine
as the better model of practical government demonstrate
Arnold's contrarian, ironic detachment from the prevalent
academic political and ethical beliefs of his time. Arnold's
style-and, frankly, his mode of argument-was based upon
anecdotal observations of the odd, self-contradictory beliefs
of the world surrounding him, and especially of the strange
beliefs of legal formalists, conservative economists, and
New Deal opponents (as well as of the nay-saying realists
themselves). The position he constructed for himself-
distinct among legal academics who addressed each other in
law reviews and academic journals to propose legal reform
191. Id. at 152.
192. Id. at 151.
193. FOLKLORE, supra note 3, at 43.
194. Id. at 209.
195. Id. at 114.
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or debate doctrinal or jurisprudential principle-resembles
those of two of his influences: the sociologist Thorstein
Veblen and, perhaps more prominently and obviously, the
journalist, editor, and public figure H.L. Mencken. 9 Like
those of Mencken and Veblen, Arnold's ironic voice at once
appealed to a general reader197 and departed from the
presumed rigors of either the formalist or social scientific
pretensions of the legal academy. He humorously deflated
the pretentious idiosyncrasies of conventional wisdom and
habit, and assumed a neutral, detached position that could
authoritatively describe the objects of his study.198
This vocal duality-popular and detached, vaguely
populist and authoritatively elitist-was part of his effort to
reach beyond the legal academy. Arnold knew Mencken and
enjoyed his work, which had reached its apex in
popularity and sarcastic style in the 1920s, 20 and invited
the journalist to visit his law school seminar. °' In listing
Mencken first in his preface to Folklore as one of the
manuscript's pre-publication readers, Arnold at least in
part recognized Mencken's commercial value.0 2 For Arnold,
196. A third ironist who may have inspired Arnold's voice was the
sociologist Vilfredo Pareto, whose theory of non-logical actions was briefly but
immensely popular during the mid-1930s and seemed to have some influence on
Arnold. As Italian sociologist Noberto Bobbio wrote, in his sociological writings
Pareto assumed a stance "apart, immobile, suspended between amusement and
horror, to contemplate the raging flood of unreason that the meager ranks of
irrational men were too few to contain." BOBBIO, supra note 129, at 38. On
Pareto's cynical irony, see HUGH DALZIEL DUNCAN, SYMBOLS AND SOCIAL THEORY
101-02 (1969); on Pareto and his influence on Arnold, see infra text
accompanying notes 116-17.
197. Indeed, Arnold clearly intended his irony both to imply victims of his
gaze and to build a "community of believers" who grasped his irony. See WAYNE
C. BOOTH, A RHETORIC OF IRONY 28-29 (1974).
198. The detachment of Arnold's voice, as well as those of his influences, is
in fact a voice and view from a specific social position-the authoritative,
powerful white male intellectual. This is no reason to dismiss Arnold's
detachment, but to situate its "practice of detachment" historically within the
discourse and subject position of its speaker. See AMANDA ANDERSON, THE
POWERS OF DISTANCE: COSMOPOLITANISM AND THE CULTIVATION OF DETACHMENT 5
(2001).
199. See GRESSLEY, supra note 13, at 44, 240-41. He specifically identified
Mencken's work as influential in his response to The New Republic's solicitation
for books that were important to his intellectual development. See BOOKS THAT
CHANGED OUR MINDS, supra note 1, at 8-9.
200. See EDWARD A. MARTIN, H.L. MENCKEN AND THE DEBUNKERS 3 (1984).
201. See GRESSLEY, supra note 13, at 32.
202. See FOLKLORE, supra note 3, at iii preface; see also id. at 146-48
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Mencken's irony offered an alternative to the banal,
stultifying, and ultimately ridiculous attitudes and opinions
it described by addressing a reader who, like the author,
could see the appalling lack of common sense in
conventional wisdom. 23 Like Mencken, Arnold described a
world in which retrograde assumptions about principles
and human behavior-whether by legal scholars,
economists, or politicians-were at once destructive and
preposterous, and as such the necessary objects of critique
and humor.
Although Arnold appropriated Mencken's voice and
position as detached ironist, their ?olitics and the extent of
their elitism were quite different. 04 Mencken combined a
commitment to civil liberties with a snobbish contempt for
democracy, demonstrated a fear and loathing of the masses
and of the political process that manipulated them, and
evidenced respect only for a small, educated, and rational
elite.20 ' He detested both the foolish in power and the foolish
(analogizing his conception of symbols and folklore to Mencken's work The
American Language). Arnold's commercial concerns about his books and
Mencken's influence on these concerns is especially clear in a letter Arnold
wrote to his editor at Yale University Press prior to Folklore's publication
noting Mencken's embrace of Symbols, complaining about the Press's poor
efforts at promoting and distributing the earlier book, and passing along
Mencken's criticisms of the Press's performance in typesetting Symbols. He
boasted of being pursued by other publishers for his follow-up to Symbols, and
implicitly warned that he would abandon the Press unless it treated his next
book as the work of the important public intellectual he aspired to be.
GRESSLEY, supra note 13, at 247-48 (reprinting letter from Arnold to Eugene
Davidson, Yale University Press, Apr. 30, 1937). Commercial success and public
recognition were important within the culture of the Yale Law School of the
1930s, when, for example, Arnold and his colleagues William Douglas and
Wesley Sturges participated in friendly competitions like the "publicity game,"
which awarded players points for prominent mentions in local and national
periodicals. See BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, WILD BILL: THE LEGEND AND LIFE OF
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 91-92 (2003).
203. See MARTIN, supra note 200, at 12.
204. See GRESSLEY, supra note 13, at 231 (reprinting letter from Arnold to
Epaphroditus Peck, attorney, Bristol, Conn., July 13, 1936).
205. See, e.g., H.L. MENCKEN, NOTES ON DEMOCRACY 14, 103 (1926) (claiming
that democracy disposes of "uncomfortable facts" "by appeals to the highest
sentiments of the human heart," and is composed solely of cynical, manipulative
demagogues and the "demaslaves" they exploit ); Id. at 21, 78 (claiming that the
American masses, which he characterized as "sheep," "donkeys," and "goats,"
cannot understand complicated words; instead, "all their thinking is done on
the level of a few primitive appetites and emotions"); Id. at 59 (celebrating elites
by noting that "most of the finer fruits of human progress, like all of the nobler
virtues of man, are the exclusive possession of small minorities, chiefly
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masses. Arnold, by contrast, seemed most annoyed and
frustrated by regressive elites and seemed honestly to care
about the masses he thought required manipulation. In
private correspondence, Arnold distinguished himself from
Mencken, who he claimed "assum[es] that the human race
are boobs"; instead, his own work took the position of the
"naturalist observing a bunch of sheep" who neither
criticizes nor defends sheep but instead "simply observes
them." Boobs and sheep may resemble each other in their
ignorant passivity, but Arnold's fascination with the masses
diverged from Mencken's absolute dismissal of them. The
irony that Mencken and similar writers of the time
employed was politically conservative. It borrowed from the
style of contemporary muckraking journalism for its
rhetorical flourish but demonstrated little interest in
intervening directly in politics to affect change in the
society they debunked. °0 While Mencken had little but
contempt for Roosevelt, °7 Arnold leapt into the New Deal
with gusto.
As a progressive academic who wrote monographs filled
with acerbic wit that reached a popular audience, Veblen
offered an alternate role model to Mencken for Arnold's
irony and for his stylistic break from the conventions of
legal realists.0 8 Veblen's caustic criticism of the formalist
tendencies of neoclassical economics was well known.2 09 He
dismissed these assumptions with caustic hyperbole,
rejecting, for example, classical economists' "hedonistic
conception of man [a]s that of a lightning calculator of
unpopular and disreputable"); see also CHARLES A. FECHER, MENCKEN: A STUDY
OF His THOUGHT 148-207 (1978) (on Mencken "the political theorist"); DOUGLAS
C. STENERSON, H.L. MENCKEN: ICONOCLAST FROM BALTIMORE 171-72 (1971)
(quoting similar anti-democratic sentiments from Mencken's earlier Baltimore
Sun columns). Notes on Democracy was Mencken's most explicit, extended
statement on American politics, and was published at the height of his
popularity in the mid-1920s. See WILLIAM MANCHESTER, H.L. MENCKEN:
DISTURBER OF THE PEACE 243-45 (1950); Walter Lippmann, Review Essay on
Notes on Democracy, SATURDAY REV. LIT., Dec. 11, 1926, at 413 (reprinted in
CRITICAL ESSAYS ON H.L. MENCKEN 72 (Douglas C. Stenerson ed., 1987)).
206. MARTIN, supra note 200, at 27.
207. See FECHER, supra note 205, at 200-07.
208. See David Riesman, Toward an Anthropological Science of Law, 57 AM.
J. Soc. 121, 123 (1951). I discussed Veblen's influence on Arnold's substantive
approach in Part I.B, supra.




pleasures and pains, who oscillates like a homogeneous
globule of desire of happiness under the impulse of stimuli
that shift him about the area, but leave him intact.
2 10
Veblen also demonstrated that a social scientist whose
detached expertise enabled him to comment on the world
around him could be a public intellectual and social critic
without writing dull, staid prose-indeed, he demonstrated
that satire and irony could be enhanced precisely because of
the author's detachment from the world he describes.21'
Arnold's voice in Symbols and Folklore had two clear
impacts on his work and its reception. First, it helped gain
a wider audience for his work. His books were humorous,
entertaining, non-technical interventions into intellectual
and political events. They neatly invoked what Wayne
Booth has called "amiable communities" of kindred spirits,
inviting the reader to conclude that Arnold is "my kind of
man, because he enjoys playing with irony, because he
assumes my capacity for dealing with and-most
important-because he grants me a kind of wisdom.
2 11
Arnold accomplished this with a mixture of detachment and
harsh critique, simultaneously demonstrating indifference
to normative judgment, a "refusal to be pinned down" to
any singular political or philosophical commitment, and an
aggressive and destructive condemnation of those who
would disagree with him.213 His ability to construct an
amiable community of fellow traveling ironists and
sympathizers, as well as to exclude the humorless
formalists and conservatives who simply didn't get it,
served him well not only in his capacity as a public
intellectual, but also during his tenure in the Justice
210. VEBLEN, THE PLACE OF SCIENCE, supra note 163, at 73-74 (1919); see
also id. at 65-66 (inveighing against the "higher or definitive syntheses and
generalizations" of classical economists, whose "standpoint of ceremonial
adequacy.., imputes to things a tendency to work out what the instructed
common sense of the time accepts as the adequate or worthy end of human
effort").
211. See Ross, supra note 162, at 214-15. Arnold also shared at least one of
Veblen's flaws: an embrace of critique at the expense of development of a clear,
systemic core. See Joseph Dorfman, The Source of Veblen's Thought, in
THORSTEIN VEBLEN: A CRITICAL REAPPRAISAL 2 (Douglas F. Dowd ed., 1958); see
also Douglas F. Dowd, Preface to id. at vii.
212. BOOTH, supra note 197, at 28 (1974).
213. See LINDA HuTCHEON, IRONY'S EDGE: THE THEORY AND POLITICS OF
IRONY 49-50, 53-54 (1994).
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Department when he explicitly sought public support for
his enforcement of antitrust law.
Second, his ironic voice also served as a stylistic
counterpart to his substantive departure from the realism
of his legal academic colleagues. It shared social science's
claims to objective detachment from the world it sought to
describe, and it departed from the norms of legal academic
discourse. Although he continued to be a progressive
functionalist seeking efficient solutions to the crises of the
Depression in opposition to legal formalists, his
monographs aspired to be general interest social criticism
that appropriated and popularized ideas and concerns from
within law schools and from across the academy. He created
something new: the witty, accessible, well-read lawyer-
critic.
IV. POLITICAL DYNAMICS, As APPLIED: THE SYMBOLS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE CRIMINAL TRIAL
Arnold's application of Political Dynamics was
haphazard at best, consisting mainly of anecdotal accounts
of legal doctrines and academic fields either in individual
chapters of Folklore and Symbols that focused on specific
doctrinal areas, or scattered as brief, anecdotal discussions
throughout one or both books.214 Nevertheless, Arnold's use
of his critical approach in the fields of criminal procedure
and administrative law demonstrates how he analyzed the
symbolic operation of governing institutions. His chapter in
Symbols on the symbolic basis and value of the criminal
trial analyzed a particular practice of governance, the jury
trial of an accused. Combining a critique of formalism's
embrace of the symbolic with a similar critique of realism's
claim to purify itself of all but functional reform, Arnold
described the functional role of the ritualistic criminal trial
in the maintenance of social order. His similarly
214. Arnold claimed that his anecdotal style in Symbols was consistent with
his rejection of "systems," and that only by producing "a series of observations,
mostly concerning details," could a "complete anatomy of the human
organization" be composed. SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 30. As explained below,
Arnold's claim that his approach entirely rejected abstractions and systems was
little more than a false and foolish boast. See infra Part V.See also Simon N.
Verdun-Jones, Jurisprudence Washed with Cynical Acid: Thurman Arnold and




symptomatic critique of prevailing conceptions of the
judicial review of federal administrative agencies also
identified the symbolic basis for judicial supremacy and the
relationship between governing institutions and the
Depression-era economy.
A. The Symbols of the Criminal Trial
If, for Arnold, the judicial system was "[t]he center of
ideals of every Western government," then few of that
system's institutional practices were as important and
symbolic as the criminal trial.215 Utilizing fairly crude
methods from comparative law, legal history, and
anthropology, Arnold posited the criminal justice system,
and especially the criminal trial, as essential to stable
primitive and developed societies from China to England,
and from medieval times to the present.216 Its symbolic
value, he argued, lies in the ceremonies of its procedures,
which the public and elites consider more important than
the fact that the process may end in an incorrect result. A
"nonceremonial injustice" in which the innocent is found
guilty after a properly conducted, formally fair trial is a less
troubling consequence of a functional criminal justice
system than a departure from the conventional ceremonies
of the trial that nevertheless results in an objectively
correct verdict.217
It is this irony, and its component internal conflict, that
Arnold analyzed in his chapter on the criminal trial in
Symbols. To provide an illustrative study of the trial's
functions in a civilized society, Arnold employed the heresy
trial of Joan of Arc, the transcript of which had recently
appeared in an English translation. 21 '8 The example
especially demonstrates Arnold's ironic approach: he
declared his respect for a clearly "political" trial in which
the accused is presumed by her judges, the faculty of the
University of Paris sitting as a secular appellate body in the
Castle of Rouen, to be guilty of a substantive crime even as
the trial began.219 Surely such a trial represents the relative
215. SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 128.
216. See id. at 128, 131-33.
217. Id. at 142.
218. See THE TRIAL OF JEANNE D'ARC, at ix (W.P. Barrett trans., 1932).
219. Id. at viii-xi.
20031 1101
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
savagery and ignorance of pre-modern conceptions of
justice. But Arnold analogized the medieval show trial to
the contemporary political trial, noting that like modern
courts that outlaw obscene materials or punish vocal
political dissent, the court considering Joan of Arc's
prosecution could do nothing but "represent the prevailing
ideals and phobias of its era. "12° The court protected its own
prestige by applying the prevailing doctrines of heresy,
belief, and ecclesiastical hierarchy. This substantive
conservatism, in which the medieval court applied the
prevailing moral code, operated alongside a fairly modern
procedural apparatus. Arnold praised the court for
developing "a record of dignity and impartiality," despite
the political pressures placed upon it, and for providing
many of the parallel requirements of modern due process.
The court even demonstrated its formal independence from
the popular and political controversy surrounding the
accused in imposing its inevitable final sentence, by
refusing to celebrate its verdict as a political victory, but
instead by making plain that it passed judgment against
Joan of Arc with "real regret, because of judicial
necessity. ,
22
In short, the medieval court served its role as a
mechanical "judicial machine" that did not, and indeed
could not, "question the underlying assumptions of the
government which it supports, however regrettable those
assumptions may be.22 At the same time, the court
activated those assumptions in a procedure that was open,
had the appearance of fairness, and that produced a record
which could enable future generations to judge its actions.224
It was savage and mechanical, a perpetrator of ideological
injustice and a symbol of great fairness.
Arnold's ironic retelling of the Joan of Arc trial parallels
his analysis of the conflicts at the heart of the modern
criminal trial. For Arnold, the modern criminal justice
system fails to provide a rational solution to the
220. SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 136-37.
221. Id. at 135-37. The due process rights afforded included medieval
analogs to the preliminary hearing, the indictment, the presentation of evidence
and the right to be heard, appellate review of a conviction, and a permanent
written record. See id. at 136-37.
222. Id. at 138.
223. Id. at 140.
224. See id. at 140.
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contradictions within which it works, or to resolve the
inadequacy and inequity of the larger society whose values
it represents. The criminal trial is inefficient as a means of
law enforcement, especially in comparison to the dispute
resolution available through arbitration and the
enforcement of federal laws and regulations by
administrative agencies.225 Its procedural and evidentiary
rules make it more closely resemble a game than an
efficient technique of investigation; its reliance on a
conception of individual criminal responsibility ignores the
insights of modern psychology and psychoanalysis. The
criminal sentences it hands down neither promise the
reform of the guilty nor the permanent safety of society by
the permanent incarceration of potentially dangerous
recidivists.2" Nevertheless, the criminal trial contains such
ideological conflicts among procedural norms, contested
conceptions of justice, and contemporary theories of
criminal behavior within elaborate rituals and dramatic
figures. The symbols of the modern criminal trial mask its
ideological and functional limits.
Arnold focused especially on the roles of defense
attorneys and juries in the criminal trial's symbolic order.
If, by their alleged actions, criminal defendants imperil the
forces of law, then their attorneys threaten to disrupt the
moral order by providing them a vigorous defense. At the
same time, if defense attorneys fail to exploit any technical
or procedural opening in the trial proceedings, they
threaten to disrupt a system of advocacy that positions
them as agents of their clients.127 An aggressive criminal
defense is essential to the trial's drama and assumption of
fairness that the defendant receive a fair hearing in which
he is represented fully and fairly. Strategic representation
of alleged wrongdoers within the game of the criminal trial,
then, at least throws into doubt the attorney's role as an
officer of the court and agent of legal order. The costs of this
representation to the efficiency of criminal justice are
merely the price of the "great humanitarian ideal" of the
fair trial. 8
225. Id. at 128-29.
226. SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 145-46.
227. See id. at 142-44.
228. Id. at 143.
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The jury plays a role parallel to that of the defense
attorney. On the one hand, the jury is "an unpredictable
body, moved by emotional considerations, and not careful of
the fundamental principles of the law because of ignorance,
prejudice, etc." '229 Yet, the jury is also "the great symbol of
justice," a deliberative assemblage of peers able to pass
judgment on the defendant and thereby give dignity to the
proceedings and the rights of the accused. 3 ' As such, the
jury functions as the romantic, colorful symbol best able to
withstand the inevitable criticism arising from
unsatisfactory results in individual cases and inconsistent
results across cases. The jury may be human,
unpredictable, and subject to irrational prejudice, but its
very weaknesses and independence from the State and
judiciary make it a valuable scapegoat or "shock absorber"
for systemic criticisms of the criminal justice system."1
Ultimately, the administration of criminal justice is not
a method of controlling crime but a popular drama of public
morality, meant to provide "a series of parables which are a
guide to the honest and a terror to the outlaw." '232 The
criminal trial symbolizes the morality and rationality of
governance, Arnold argued, offering "the heaven of justice
which lies behind the insecurity, cruelty, and irrationality
of an everyday world."233 It may not provide an efficient and
satisfactory resolution of the conflicts and contradictions
between the individual and the state, but it validates both
the dignity of the state's power and the dignity of the
individual within the dramatic spectacle that pits one
against the other in a formally equal setting.34 As such,
Arnold argued, the criminal trial serves as an essential
ideological symbol of a rational judicial system within a
stable government and society.35
229. Id. at 144.
230. Id. at 144-45.
231. SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 144-45.
232. Id. at 147-48.
233. Id. at 129.
234. Id. at 130.
235. Id. To Arnold, substantive criminal law was no different. The
Securities Act of 1934, which Arnold considered a political compromise that
failed adequately to protect investors or serve the needs of the modern economy,
included unnecessary criminal penalties to provide a merely symbolic
demonstration of the moral rectitude of legislators, regulators, rational
investors, and Wall Street. See id. at 133-34.
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B. The Symbols of Administrative Law
Arnold concluded that the powerful spectacle of the
criminal trial provides a certain degree of comfort and
satisfaction for political subjects in its procedural format
and seemingly impartial application of substantive law. The
administrative tribunal, by contrast, never seems
satisfying, failing to provide the necessary symbolic
assurance that the underlying philosophical disputes about
the relationship between the State and the individual have
been fairly considered and resolved.236 The administrative
agency is unable to garner the symbolic status of the
criminal court when it sits as a tribunal or crafts regulatory
schemes; this symbolic deficiency masks the modern
agency's expert ability to gather data and experiment with
regulatory programs necessary to rescue the economy from
the Depression. Although he was not alone in considering
the practice and teaching of administrative law during the
mid-1930s or in his advocacy on behalf of the New Deal,
Arnold's approach was distinct in that he situated
administrative law within the cultural symbols of
governance as well as within the context of competing
arguments regarding legal doctrine and the functionality of
administrative agencies.
Arnold's overriding legal focus in Symbols and Folklore
was on the judicial review of administrative agencies.
Arnold was convinced that agencies enjoyed relative
advantages in investigating and attacking the largest
economic and social problems of the day.237 He rejected the
traditional schema that juxtaposed administrative
agencies-the looming, demonic symbols of bureaucracy-
against the privileged judiciary-the supposedly neutral
institution with sacred powers to interpret the Constitution
and scrutinize legislative and administrative actions.3 ' The
236. See SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 133.
237. See, e.g., SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 266-67 (claiming an approach
empowering administrative agencies would enable the country to benefit from
their "huge reservoir of technical skill, capable of running a great productive
machine with new energy and efficiency").
238. SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 205-06. See also RONEN SHAMIR, MANAGING
LEGAL UNCERTAINTY: ELITE LAWYERS IN THE NEW DEAL 99-100 (1995) (placing
Arnold in the context of other elite lawyers and legal academics who
championed administrative agencies over the judiciary as state actors most
likely to respond effectively to the Depression).
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widespread judicial fetish, combined with the prevailing
(though by no means uncontradicted239 ) negative conception
of administrative law, assumed an inherent value in
maintaining a strict separation of the tri-partite branches
of government.24 ° It was this assumption, Arnold believed,
that enabled a formalist, conservative judiciary to thwart
the New Deal's efforts to promote the production and
distribution of the "comforts" necessary to relieve the
Depression. 41
The problem, Arnold argued, was symbolic. Formalism's
legal distinction between courts and agencies, which in his
more conventional realist mode he happily debunked, was
in fact constituted by the prevailing symbolic duality
between courts and agencies. The legal, in other words, was
epiphenomenal of a symbolic base. He argued that the
romantic legal vision of a powerful judiciary that is fair,
impartial, and necessarily protective of individual freedoms,
and that is therefore opposed to the dangerous
"bureaucracy" of administrative agencies, follows from two
highly symbolic aspects of the judiciary's role as official
arbiter of official disputes. First, courts profit from their
position as institutions that merely apply legal authority, in
239. See generally G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL
103-08 (Harvard University Press 2000) (describing challenges to essentialist
conception of separation of powers in late-nineteenth and early-twentieth
century prior to Supreme Court's reinvigoration of nondelegation doctrine in
1935); see also id. at 98-103 (describing how administrative agencies such as the
Interstate Commerce Commission had grown in power and achieved some
measure of popular and judicial acceptance during the early part of the
twentieth century, in part because of the implicit assumption that Arnold, his
contemporaries, and earlier proponents of state intervention put forth regarding
the necessity for administrative agencies to regulate the complexities of a
modern industrial economy).
240. Arnold was specifically reacting to the Court's reinvigoration of the
nondelegation doctrine in the mid-1930s. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
298 U.S. 238 (1936) (invalidating Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 for
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to fix hours and wages to
certain coal producers and miners); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495 (1935) (declaring National Industrial Recovery Act
unconstitutional because its codes of fair competition lacked enforcement
standards); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (declaring
section 9(c) of National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutional for granting
the President authority to determine and enforce policies regarding production
and transportation of petroleum). These cases marked what G. Edward White
calls the "unexpected" and temporary shift by the Court back to a "traditional
separation of powers theory" in the mid-1930s. WHITE, supra note 239, at 108.
241. SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 252-53.
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the form of neutral rules of procedure and substantive
common and statutory law that is external to them. Even
when the results of their decisions are troubling, courts
could never be at fault (unless, of course, they misapplied
the law they are bound to uphold).242 Second, the judiciary
also appears to be a neutral, apolitical institution because
of its apparent physical and political removal from the
disputes it settles.243  Within this formalist vision,
bureaucracies symbolize the inverse of the judiciary
because they establish their own substantive rules and
procedures, "that particularly silly form of rule and
precedent known as red tape," which they apply to their
subjects. " As creatures of the executive branch, they seem
less attached to the "Law" and more directly connected to
the political hurly-burly.
This symbolic structure of administrative law produced
the peculiar pathologies of legal resistance to the New Deal.
Formalism's enduring symbolic construction of courts and
administrative agencies perpetuated the folkloric belief that
courts protect individual freedom while administrative
agencies are demonic forces of inefficiency and collectivity,
and that courts represent a "rule of law above men" while
administrative tribunals "apply practical considerations to
court decisions.""5 The symbolic assumptions of the
formalist approach to administrative law granted
conservative courts-already predisposed to strike down
new regulatory regimes and rules under the false
assumption that they were thereby protecting freedom-too
much discretion to reverse agency decisions and the
legislative authorization of regulation. Agencies were
therefore relegated to secondary status behind the
judiciary, especially when their specific actions or general
legal authority faced a legal challenge. Under the "trial by
combat" model, legal challenges to administrative action
that arose from the false duality between courts and
agencies provided little more than
a series of miracle plays to give [the individual dispute and its
judicial resolution] a theatrical development. In the memory of the
present generation the moral lesson of the judicial miracle play
242. See id. at 205-06.
243. See id.
244. Id.
245. FOLKLORE, supra note 3, at 372.
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has been that rugged individuals are not regulated. Instead, they
fight for their rights. In this battle they expect government to let
them alone.246
The litigation, trial-by-combat model of judicial review,
which requires courts to evaluate a challenge to an entire
regulatory regime through the prism of a dispute between
one or more individuals and the agency and/or federal
government, was a foolishly inefficient and indeterminate
means for evaluating the legality and wisdom of an agency's
actions .247
Even when agencies defeated a challenge to a
regulation or an action, they lost the larger war. In victory,
they assumed the symbolic role of the bureaucratic giant
that had successfully infringed upon the "individual
freedom" of the "rugged individuals," whom the giant met in
a battle whose outcome was determined by the judiciary's
higher, neutral authority.48 Judicial supremacy, and
concomitant administrative inferiority, emanated from the
formalist symbolic hierarchy that privileged the judiciary
and law over agencies and policy. To oppose this duality, in
which agencies always occupy the lesser of the two
available positions, one must deploy propaganda and
folklore.
C. Conclusion
Analyzing specific sets of legal doctrines and practices,
Arnold applied a critical approach that combined insights
from legal realism with those of social sciences to criticize,
ironize, and affect change in prevailing governing
institutions. He had no prescription for the conflicts at the
heart of the criminal justice system; he seemed to accept as
inevitable and necessary the criminal trial's function as a
set of contentious, dramatic rituals necessary for the
system's continuing operation. His analysis of the judicial
review of administrative agencies, by contrast, was largely
246. SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 187-88.
247. See generally id. at 172-98 (criticizing "trial by combat" model of
judicial review). For a more detailed discussion of Arnold's proposed revision of
administrative law, see Mark Fenster, A Folklore for Bureaucracy: Thurman
Arnold's Symbolic Legal Practice and Competing Vision of Administrative Law
for the New Deal (draft on file with author).
248. SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 187-88.
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critical, although he failed to offer specific prescriptions to
remedy the spiritual regime of judicial supremacy he
deplored. He was clearly more troubled by the effects of
administrative law's symbolic terrain than by the inefficient
and occasionally unjust effects of the ritualistic criminal
trial.
In both analyses, Arnold attempted to match an
institution's temporal effectivity with its spiritual power.
The criminal justice system, as flawed and ritualistic as it
might be, met modernity's symbolic needs reasonably well,
and at least as well as analogous institutions in more
"primitive" societies (from Melanesian tribes to medieval
ecclesiastic courts). Improving the system at the risk of its
symbolic structures would be a dangerous undertaking,
given the symbolic importance of the appearance of fairness
and the functions of punishment for the guilty. The crisis of
the Depression in the midst of technological possibility,
available labor, and plentiful natural resources that could
be successfully coordinated by a vigorous federal regulatory
regime, however, was a temporal crisis caused by symbolic,
or ideological, limits. Although he clearly doubted the
extent to which the prevailing symbols of governance could
be changed, he advocated utilizing them for temporal
change.
V. THE FOLKLORE OF ARNOLD: THE LIMITS OF "POLITICAL
DYNAMIcs"
Arnold's inquiry into the symbolic realm of governance
was an important approach to the study of political and
legal rule. It was methodologically, conceptually, and
politically flawed, however. He tended towards simplistic,
anecdotal explanations of culture and politics (in, for
example, his nearly essentialist distinction between the
"temporal" and "spiritual"); and he was blind to the
troubling political implications of his willingness to sacrifice
democratic political structures and processes for functional
solutions that he maintained would maximize industrial
production and make more efficient the distribution of
needed consumer goods. These flaws demonstrate the limits
of the functionalism that prevailed in pre-war legal theory
and mainstream social science generally.
Arnold's work so excessively attacked formalism and
abstract thought, and so privileged pragmatic action by
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insulated leaders, that it often lapsed into anti-intellectual,
seemingly nihilistic pronouncements on the essential
meaninglessness of popular politics.249 Although he claimed
that his wholly temporal approach was free of the
"spiritual" bias of normative, conceptual principles,"' his
theory of "symbols" and his commitment to maximizing
social wealth through the instrumental application of
"temporal" policies depended upon conceptual and
normative commitments to abstract concepts external to the
objective world he observed."' His embrace of the functional
and distaste for the spiritual also rendered him unable to
make normative distinctions between competing political
regimes, leading him to support, or to fail to reject
sufficiently, fascism, totalitarianism, and corruption for
their temporal achievements." 2 Although he conceded that
249. See DUXBURY, supra note 2, at 30-34; see also Joseph Singer, The Player
and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 48-50 (1984)
(summarizing criticism of realists as nihilists).
250. See Thurman Arnold, The Folklore of Mr. Hook-A Reply, 5 U. CHI. L.
REV. 349, 349, 352-53 (1938) (responding to Sidney Hook, The Politician's
Handbook-A Review, 5 U. CHI. L. REV. 341 (1938)) [hereinafter Arnold, Hook]
(claiming to eschew the prescription of ideal "beautiful portraits" and "ethical
formulas" for society, and refusing to discuss the values upon which his work
relied); see also id. at 353 (rejecting abstract definitions of philosophical
"values" because they create confusion by relying on words (such as "fascism,"
"communism," or "bureaucracy") "which impede practical methods of
distributing goods"). Arnold blithely, and far too easily, dismissed the "vice of
definition." See FOLKLORE, supra note 3, at 33 (refusing to "delay our exposition"
providing definitions of key terms like "habits" and "creeds" because, as a
lawyer, he had "indulged too long in the vice of definition to have any illusions
that it leads to understanding). Arnold's embrace of the ideal of practicality and
direct experience over principle and theory was a classically American type of
anti-intellectualism. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN
AMERICAN LIFE 236-37 (1963).
251. See EDWIN N. GARLAN, LEGAL REALISM AND JUSTICE 15-16 (1941);
Arnold, Hook, supra note 250, at 348; see also Max Lerner, The Shadow World
of Thurman Arnold, 47 YALE L.J. 687, 688, 694, 702 (1938); Edward H. Levi,
The Natural Law, Precedent, and Thurman Arnold, 24 VA. L. REV. 587, 610-11
(1938). In addition, although Arnold's first and foremost normative commitment
was to wealth maximization, he praised, largely in passing, such abstract
virtues as working for one's fellow man rather than solely for oneself (see
SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 263-66), and the rights of criminal defendants to a
fair trial. See SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 134-35. Arnold failed to develop these
additional commitments at all, however. But see KEARNY, supra note 13, at 56-
60 (claiming Arnold was committed to some basic humanitarian principles and
human rights, though such commitments became more apparent later in his
life).
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both the Soviet and German regimes were intolerant and
cruel, 253 he saw these as possible, but not certain, results of
a more efficient form of governance at a time of political and
social crisis." 4 Because the U.S. political tradition was not
susceptible to fascism and totalitarianism, such would not
be the byproduct of a governing American regime that was
truly effective on the temporal plane.255
252. See, e.g., FOLKLORE, supra note 3, at 41-42 (remarking that Hitler's
"strength" lay in his increasing employment and "national pride," and conceding
merely that "[h]is weakness lay in his persecutions" which, Arnold asserted,
were not necessary to a command economy or to "the development of national
morale"); see also SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 169, 227 (praising American
municipal political machines for doing "the work of our Government" despite
the fact that they must operate "sub rosa" because they conflict with political
ideals). Many of Arnold's contemporary critics criticized such statements. See
Edward S. Corwin, Thurman Arnold's Folklore of Capitalism, 32 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 745, 746 (1938) (book review); Arnold, Hook, supra note 250, at 346-49;
Lerner, supra note 251, at 687; Philip Mechem, The Jurisprudence of Despair,
21 IOWA L. REV. 669, 690, 692 (1936); see also Charles W. Smith, The
Intelligence Factor in Public Opinion: A Comment on Some Recent Publications,
1 J. POL. 301, 303-04 (1939) (comparing Arnold's analysis of propaganda to the
"disturbing" and similar analyses written by Hitler and Machiavelli). More
recent critics along these lines include DUXBURY, supra note 2, at 30-34; and
Warren P. Hill, The Psychological Realism of Thurman Arnold, 22 U. CHI. L.
REV. 377, 378-79 (1955).
253. See SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 243, 245-46; see also FOLKLORE, supra
note 3, at 172 (noting the "cruelty," "intolerance," "repression," and "blood and
terror" of the Nazis and Fascists, as well, he predicted, the Soviets in the
future).
254. SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 241-42; but see Arnold, Hook, supra note
250, at 345-46 (characterizing Arnold's thought as operating "in the pre-
reflective pupa stage" in making the distinction between the means and ends of
national unification and economic recovery under Hitler).
255. See SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 243, 247-48. Arnold conceded that the
U.S. was susceptible to political corruption, such as that of municipal political
machine, but he perversely reveled in describing the city machines as functional
regimes that could achieve practical ends that more "ethical," Progressive local
governmental regimes failed to meet because the latter were limited by their
adherence to principles while the former were concerned solely with the
"practical tasks of government." See, e.g., FOLKLORE, supra note 3, at 43, 114;
SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 169, 270-71. Most contemporary historians disagree.
On machine politics, see JOHN M. ALLSWANG, BOSSES, MACHINES, AND URBAN
VOTERS (rev. ed. 1986); THE CITY Boss IN AMERICAN (Alexander B. Callow ed.,
1976); Harvey Boulay & Alan DiGaetano, Why Did Political Machines
Disappear?, 12 J. URB. HIST. 25 (1985). On municipal reform movements, see
RAYMOND A. MOHL, THE NEW CITY: URBAN AMERICA AND THE INDUSTRIAL AGE,
1860-1920 (1985); BRADLEY RICE, PROGRESSIVE CITIES: THE COMMISSION
GOVERNMENT MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1901-20 (1977); MARTIN SCHEISL, THE
POLITICS OF EFFICIENCY: MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION AND REFORM IN AMERICA,
1800-920 (1977).
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Ultimately, Arnold was a relativist willing to consider
the advantages of any regime that could meet his specific
technocratic conception of efficiency.256 He assumed that his
goal of efficiency required the management of governing
private and public institutions by insulated, practical
leaders supported by a citizenry that had been either
persuaded or manipulated into trusting its leaders.257 Under
the logic of technocratic efficiency, for example, Arnold
blithely and naively embraced the United States' colonial
occupation of the Philippines in the late-nineteenth and
early-twentieth centuries as a triumphant infusion of
modern technocracy that brought "humanitarian
imperialism" to a thankful native population, and he
suggested that this approach could be profitably used to
govern American cities."' Similarly, Arnold's belief in the
role omniscient experts could play in managing the masses
led him to propose as a model of governance the insane
asylum, in which physicians seeking to make inmates "as
comfortable as possible" assume their subjects' irrationality
in attempting to treat their pathologies." Arnold blithely
dismissed democratic values and process as necessarily and
solely "a dramatic spectacle" that can and should be
"controlled" in the same way as the "emotional
maladjustments of individuals.""26 Like other intellectuals of
his day (including, to an extent, legal realists), Arnold
rejected traditional democratic theory, cast doubt on
traditional notions of participatory democracy (and the
256. On the "technocratic bargain" between social science and managerial
capitalism of the 1920s, the tradition that Arnold carried forward, see Guy
ALCHON, THE INVISIBLE HAND OF PLANNING: CAPITALISM, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND
THE STATE IN THE 1920s 67-70, 175 n.1 (1985). In this regard, he was consistent
with both the realists and the institutional economists. On the relativism and
functionalism of realists, see KALMAN, supra note 2, at 3; PURCELL, supra note
37, at 86-87. On the functionalism of institutional economists, see NICHOLAS
MERCURO & STEVEN C. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM POSNER TO
POSTMODERNISM 107 (1997).
257. See Ayer, supra note 2, at 1085.
258. See SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 111-12. On the troubling history of the
American colonial occupation of the Philippines, see generally H. W. BRANDS,
BOUND TO EMPIRE: THE UNITED STATES AND THE PHILIPPINES 53-103 (1992);
VINCENTE L. RAFAEL, WHITE LOVE AND OTHER EVENTS IN FILIPINO HISTORY 19-75
(2000); THE PHILIPPINES READER: A HISTORY OF COLONIALISM, NEOCOLONIALISM,
DICTATORSHIP, AND RESISTANCE 35-55 (Daniel B. Schirmer & Stephen
Rosskamm Shalom eds., 1987).
259. SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 232-33.
260. FOLKLORE, supra note 3, at 344.
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possibility of their implementation), emphasized the
irrationality of the masses, and accepted the need for a
dominant elite. 61 As a political project, Political Dynamics
was marked by, and perhaps even surpassed, the troubling
tendencies of its intellectual period.
Nor did Political Dynamics lack defects as an
intellectual project. Arnold's conceptualization of the
symbols and institutions of governance was static and
simplistic. He failed to differentiate among symbols and
assumed their meaning to be plain and unitary, and
thereby failed to recognize that symbols have different and
conflicting evocative, emotional, and ideological effects, and
are themselves part of a wider cultural context.262 For
Arnold, a symbol was merely an emotionally charged word
or image that referred only to a false system of belief rather
than to the real conditions of governance; it could gain no
purchase on the "temporal" plane where, presumably,
practical managers communicated in forms that
corresponded directly with the "true" reality of efficiency.263
He provided a crude conception of meaning and power by
assuming that symbols, though essential to human
behavior and governance, are merely conservative and
obfuscatory and that symbolic messages have direct effects
upon the individual.26" Although he rejected the abstract
rationality of "economic man" (whose sole purpose is to
maximize his wealth) and the abstract sinfulness of "legal
man" (whose sole purpose is to misbehave),265 his own work
assumed a similarly abstract "symbolic man" whose sole
261. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN: PROGRESS
AND ITS CRITICS 432-37 (1991) (characterizing Arnold as "[tihe 'Machiavelli' of
the Managerial Revolution," a technocrat who promoted elite governance of the
public and private); PURCELL, supra note 37, at 113-14 (criticizing Arnold's
emphasis on the irrational and his rejection of democracy in favor of a ruling,
manipulative elite); ROBERT H. WIEBE, SELF-RULE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 207 (1995) (noting that FOLKLORE, "often cited as the
New Deal's most significant commentary on government, derisively dismissed
the very thought of popular rule"); Lerner, supra note 251, at 697 (criticizing
Arnold's "anti-massism" and belief in the malleability of the masses).
262. See GARLAN, supra note 251, at 108; Lerner, supra note 251, at 696-97.
263. See, e.g., FOLKLORE, supra note 3, at 150-51, 168.
264. See Lerner, supra note 251, at 695-97. Arnold's inadequate
assumptions regarding the psychology of individuals is attributable at least in
part to his alliance with Edward Robinson, whose work was even less
sophisticated than his own. Id. at 695.
265. SYMBOLS, supra note 3, at 77-78.
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purpose, it seems, is to be manipulated. This simplistic
assumption, derived from Lasswell, Lippmann, Pareto, and
his minimal appropriation of some of the basic concepts of
anthropology, coupled with his commitment to government
by expert, resulted in an impoverished vision of democracy
and of social interaction."'6
Arnold's approach to the study of institutions was often
as simplistic as his approach to symbols. Relying on an
unproblematized, anthropomorphized vision of institutions
as individuals with coherent personalities, his approach
merely reproduced the same error that he made in his
behavioralist conception of the individual's response to
symbolic communication.267 His study of institutions was
largely the seriatim analysis of official statements and news
reports made at a particular historical moment; he neither
studied, nor proposed, a more systematic methodology that
would analyze the use of symbols in different historical
periods, or that acknowledged the use of competing symbols
by a range of individuals and institutions. 8 Like the
institutionalist economists upon whose theories of the
institution in modern industrial society he relied, Arnold
demonstrated no interest in the sociological study of actual
institutions;6 . his interest seemed to end with the
presumption that they reproduced the structure and
dynamics of dominant institutions and incorporated the
subject within the symbolic realm.
These flaws represent, to a degree, the limits of
Arnold's time and position: despite breaking from realism,
he was still bound to realism's functionalism, and despite
his interest in the true and the expert, he was, like many of
266. John Dewey's critique of Walter Lippmann serves as an apt critique to
Lasswell's and Arnold's theories of propaganda and the manufacture of consent.
Dewey condemned such approaches for failing to conceptualize the public as an
engaged participant in governance requiring sufficient information to make
rational collective decisions, and for failing to recognize that government by
expert elites is doomed to failure because it would lack legitimacy and
responsiveness to the public's needs. See JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS
PROBLEMS 148-49, 167-71, 203-19 (1927); MATTHEW FESTENSTEIN, PRAGMATISM
AND POLITICAL THEORY: FROM DEWEY TO RORTY 82-99 (1997).
267. See FOLKLORE, supra note 3, at 350-52.
268. See Verdun-Jones, supra note 214, at 481.
269. See DUXBURY, supra note 15, at 101. Walton Hamilton-Arnold's
colleague and friend, and the institutionalist with whom Arnold was best
acquainted-actively opposed empirical legal research. See SCHLEGEL, supra
note 25, at 311 n.259.
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his fellow realists, undisciplined as an analyst and nascent
social scientist. These flaws did not render his work useless
in his own time, however. As Max Lerner-one of Arnold's
contemporaries and author of one of the most critical
reviews of Folklore"-demonstrated, one could recognize
the limitations of Arnold's work while still utilizing some of
its insights.27' Moreover, as I argue in the Conclusion, the
significant questions he posed about law's relation to
governance, and his act of seeking answers in the emerging
social sciences of the interwar years, make his project
analogous to similar intellectual projects in contemporary
legal studies.
CONCLUSION
Arnold's career as a legal theorist largely ended with
the publication of Folklore and Symbols, leaving entirely
undeveloped his proposed field of "Political Dynamics."2 '2 He
270. See Lerner, supra note 251.
271. See Max Lerner, Constitution and Court As Symbols, 46 YALE L.J.
1290, 1290 note (1937) (citing SYMBOLS as one of several works of which essay
was a "gloss"); id. at 1319 (describing symbol-making of "the common man" as
engine of progressive social change). Lerner's essay was, however, published
before his critical review of Folklore, and was probably written before Folklore's
publication. See GRESSLEY, supra note 13, at 263 (reprinting letter from
Thurman Arnold to Porter Sargent, Aug. 6, 1937) (noting that by August 1937
he still had not submitted a final draft of Folklore).
The essay criticized the dead weight of residual symbols of the constitution
as protector of property rights, and praised the emergent symbol-making of an
energized working class. Lerner, supra. A public intellectual during the 1930s
who was further to the political left than Arnold, Lerner had attended Yale Law
School briefly and worked with Walton Hamilton at the short-lived Brookings
Graduate School in Washington. See SANFORD LAKOFF, MAX LERNER: PILGRIM IN
THE PROMISED LAND 40-46, 90 (1998). As Lakoff summarizes, at the time Lerner
thought that "[t]he special task for radical intellectuals ... was to think
through the character of the transition [from the New Deal to socialism] and
formulate the principles with which political leaders could mobilize a following."
Id. at 92.
272. Following his tenure in the Antitrust Division (during which he wrote
The Bottlenecks of Business-which was more of an intervention into a specific
political issue than a statement of legal theory), Arnold served for two years on
the District of Columbia Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals before entering
private practice, where he spent the remainder of his career until his death in
1969. See generally GRESSLEY, supra note 13, at 51-94. In those years he
published only one important article, in which he both dismissed and
lampooned Henry Hart's criticism of the U.S. Supreme Court for failing to
provide adequate reasoning in support of their recent decisions. Id. at 88-90.
Utilizing his familiar tendencies of puncturing formalist arrogance, the article
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entered the Roosevelt administration as head of the
Antitrust Division in the Justice Department in 1938, and
enjoyed a relatively successful five-year period as the
country's leading antitrust enforcer." Following a brief,
frustrating stint as a federal appellate judge on the D.C.
Circuit, he entered private practice, where he remained as a
prominent and well-connected attorney for the remainder of
his life.274 But in his important mid-1930s monographs,
Arnold had combined realism's functionalist critique of
formalism with emergent fields of social scientific inquiry in
a compelling and entertaining, if idiosyncratic, critique and
pragmatic utilization of the symbols of governance. His
post-realist reconsideration of formalism as a symbolic
discourse whose invocation is necessary for governance
recognized that symbols constitute the conditions of
possibility of governance.
As a legal theorist and social scientist, Arnold's
strengths lay in rejecting the provincial methods and focus
of legal academia, in extending legal realism beyond the
disciplinary and conceptual limits of its anti-formalism, and
in recognizing the symbolic realm of governance; his flaws
lay in pushing realism's functionalism even further towards
a technocratic managerialism and in failing to provide
sufficiently complex theories of the production and
reception of symbols. Although they may be flawed as
cultural criticism and as excessively functionalist,
antidemocratic political practice, Symbols and Folklore
included insights into the relationship between governance
and meaning that distinguished him from his
contemporaries in legal academia. They represented a
creative effort to construct an interdisciplinary approach
out of critical concepts appropriated from legal realism,
political science and sociology, anthropology, and
largely reiterated familiar realist themes regarding the fallible human elements
of the deliberative process and the indeterminacy of judicial opinions. See
Thurman Arnold, Professor Hart's Theology, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1298, 1310-14
(1960) (responding to Henry Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices,
The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1959)).
273. See, e.g., ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF
MONOPOLY: A STUDY IN ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE 431-55 (1966); WYATT WELLS,
ANTITRUST & THE FORMATION OF THE POSTWAR WORLD 43-83 (2002); Alan
Brinkley, The Antimonopoly Idea and the Liberal State: The Case of Thurman
Arnold, 80 J. AM. HIST. 557 (1993).
274. See Waller, supra note 13.
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economics. Accordingly, Arnold was the first post-realist
scholar, presaging the varied post-war movements in legal
theory that place law within broader systems of governance
and society, and that bring to the study of law methods and
theoretical approaches from other disciplines. Although his
work was not essential to the development of, for example,
policy science, law and society, law and economics, and
critical legal studies, Arnold considered in productive and
compelling ways many of the issues these approaches have
raised regarding the functional purpose and symbolic
structures of law. 75 The theoretical insights and empirical
research resulting from these developments in legal theory
and legal studies may have surpassed what Arnold himself
produced and envisioned. Nevertheless, his early critique of
realism's limits makes him an important transitional figure
between realism and its aftermath.
In addition to his historical importance, Arnold's
contemporary relevance and his ongoing popularity also
emanates from his ironic authorial voice. Besides his initial
insights into realism's limits and law's position within
wider symbols of governance, his ultimate success has been
as a social and cultural critic whose value lies in the telling
anecdote rather than in careful study, in humor rather than
in solemn exegesis, and in polemic rather than in objective
disinterest. He could shatter the pretensions of criminal
procedure and unquestioned faith in judicial review with a
savage irony that maintains its relevance and bite. This
.may best explain why Arnold is best remembered for his
voice than for the field of "Political Dynamics," which,
thanks to its lack of methodological and conceptual clarity,
was forgotten soon after Folklore's publication.
Considered this way, the Arnold of Folklore and
Symbols emerges as the Mencken of pre-war legal academia
who, like Veblen, provided a trenchant, well-circulated, and
entertaining critique of the reigning pretensions and
common sense of his time. Arnold smartly developed and
exploited this figure for political ends by bringing attention
to the political effects of "Law," "Government," and
"Capitalism" during the crisis of the Depression. As such,
he presents an engaged and engaging figure of the legal
275. The precise connection between Arnold's work and the ever-
proliferating schools of post-realist thought are beyond the scope of this Article,
but I plan to trace these relationships in a later essay.
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academic as public intellectual, a figure that has long
proven its usefulness-at least to Arnold's career and
prominence during his lifetime. Arnold's willingness to
employ his critical skills and figure proved politically useful
during the New Deal and ultimately for the enforcement of
the antitrust policies of the Roosevelt administration. Being
the celebrated critic of law and governance helped, or at
least did not impede, Arnold's career as a public lawyer who
reached the heights of academia, government, the judiciary,
and private practice.27  And today, although no
contemporary school of legal scholarship relies on Arnold's
work, his ironic, detached stance and critical voice continue
to fascinate and attract those exposed to him.
276. In this regard, Arnold's popular success as a social critic served a
similar role as the empirical social science work of William 0. Douglas and
Charles Clark, both of whom utilized early success in their research to launch
careers in government and then in the judiciary. See Bryant G. Garth, Book
Review, 45 J. LEG. EDUC. 606, 606-07 (1995) (reviewing SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN
LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE, supra note 25).
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